Research shows that when local newspapers fade away:

• Local Political Awareness Erodes: Citizens know less about local issues and are less likely to participate in state and local politics.
• Nationalization of Politics Intensifies: All politics becomes national politics.
• Democratic Accountability Weakens: Local corruption thrives when no one is watching.
• Civic Engagement Declines: Voter turnout decreases, especially in smaller communities.

Now, new findings tie the death of local newspapers to something even more worrisome: increased polarization and an increase in straight-ticket voting.

Let’s dive into the academic research that unpacks these intriguing connections.

Paper Introduction

The researchers sought to answer a pressing question: what happens to voting behavior when local newspapers shut down?

Specifically, they examined the effect of these closures on split-ticket voting—where voters pick candidates from different parties for different offices.

The hypothesis? Fewer newspapers might mean less local political news, leading voters to rely on national, partisan sources instead. Spoiler alert: the hypothesis holds water.

Methodology

This study employed a quasi-experimental design using genetic matching.

It compared counties with and without newspaper closures between 2009 and 2012 while controlling for demographic and economic factors.

The researchers analyzed 110 closures and measured changes in split-ticket voting by looking at differences in votes for presidential and senatorial candidates in 2012. Their main dataset came from the National Digital Newspaper Program and other demographic sources.

Results and Findings

1. 1. • A 1.9% Drop in Split-Ticket Voting Counties that lost a local newspaper saw a decline in split-ticket voting, meaning voters were more likely to align their choices strictly with party lines. While the percentage may seem small, this represents a meaningful uptick in polarization.
      • The Role of National News Voters in affected counties appeared to turn to national media, which is brimming with partisan rhetoric. Without local reporting to highlight nuanced, community-specific political issues, voters defaulted to “us versus them” party cues.
      • It’s Not About Information Loss The researchers ruled out the idea that voters simply lacked enough political information. Instead, they suggested that nationalized media drowned out diverse perspectives, emphasizing polarized party identities.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

1. Is 1.9% really that large? This study look at changes for national offices.  At the local level (congressional & state legislatures), it is likely that a voter lives in a safe district, and 1.9% isn’t likely to make a huge difference.
2. Generality of Results:
   The study used counties as its unit of analysis, which may mask individual-level differences in behavior. Future research could incorporate voter surveys for a more granular view.
3. Limited Time Frame:
   The analysis stops at 2012 (darn peer review….), and it’s unclear whether the trends persisted or grew stronger in subsequent years as media consolidation continued.  The
4. Geographic:
   Regions with robust alternative media sources might experience less polarization than those with few news outlets.  Exploring the rural/urban divide specifically and expanding the dataset to include these factors could yield deeper insights.

Conclusion

Local newspapers are more than just sources for restaurant health reports, high school football scores, and lottery numbers.

They serve as a vital check against potential corruption and the increasing influence of nationalized, hyper-partisan news outlets.

This study presents a clear message:  local journalism is about more than mere nostalgia – it’s about mitigating the growing political divide in America.

Sadly, I believe the decline of local newspapers is now irreversible.

Despite recognizing the effects, I confess I cancelled my own subscription to the local newspaper.  The “local” newspaper had lost its local focus, and honestly, the overall product is terrible. (To add insult to injury, the cancellation process was appalling. After paying online, I was forced to speak with a persistent salesperson who tried to pressure me with “special deals” “just for me.”)

Nevertheless, it’s essential that we grasp the significant consequences of this trend.

Introduction to Polarization

I’ve written about polarization many times over the past year. It’s one of the most significant factors in U.S. politics today, if not the most. Typically, I focus on one individual study or paper, but today I want to zoom out and examine the findings in a broader context.

Neo-Beginnings

Every graduate student in political science since the early 2010s has likely written a paper reconciling the academic “disagreement” between Morris Fiorina and Alan Abramowitz.

As far as academic “disagreements” go this one was…combative and sharp.   It was / is a doozy.

The argument in a nutshell:

• • Fiorina argues that polarization is primarily an elite-driven phenomenon, with political elites (politicians, activists, media) becoming more polarized while the mass public remains relatively moderate. For the general public, he suggests that there is more sorting than true ideological polarization—voters align their party identification with their preferences, but they are not deeply divided on most policy issues. (Fiorina et al, 2011)
• • Abramowitz, on the other hand, emphasizes that polarization is widespread among the electorate, especially among the most engaged citizens, who have become more ideologically consistent and politically divided. He argues that as the electorate becomes more polarized, affective polarization (i.e., the emotional dislike of opposing partisans) increases. (Abramowitz, 2017)

For me, it was strange argument because their views are compatible with each other, when you ask the question, “Under what circumstances can both of these positions be correct?”  (Especially when we have the ability to consider additional research?)

Among political elites, Abramowitz is right—polarization is high, emotional, and often extreme. Among non-elites, Fiorina’s position holds more weight, but research suggests he may be looking in the wrong place.

Most of the general public doesn’t deeply care about politics. This is estimated by some to be 20-30% of the people (Kalmoe, 2020).  I have seen some that estimate it as low as 15% (Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD., n.d.).

However, when polled about policy, many give moderate responses—what they often mean is, “I don’t know, and I don’t care.” This middle-of-the-road answer satisfies the pollster but doesn’t represent how they’ll vote.

Instead, their behavior is guided by cues from political leaders or social circles. These cues encourage distrust and dislike of the opposing party, making voter behavior appear polarized even when personal ideology isn’t.

Said another way, it is really difficult for any pollster to capture an answer posed about the funding mechanisms of charter schools when the answer is likely closer to:

“meh, I don’t really care about this issue and/or I am not knowledgeable about the issue.  I’ll answer your question with a middle of the road answer because you asked politely – but know I will very likely govern my political behavior by cues received from my political party – especially political leaders – and/or my social circle that I value which are now highly correlated.  And both of those are likely to tell me not to like the “other” party and that is basic human nature anyway, so my political behavior and voting will appear polarized too.” – voter

To add some final nuance: Abramowitz’s view dominates in low-turnout elections, like primaries, where highly engaged voters participate in mostly non-competitive districts. (and well since political elites and political nerds tend to hang out together… their perception is of extreme polarization…leading to more affect polarization…leading the public…)

But I digress, Fiorina’s perspective becomes more relevant in general elections, where turnout is higher and broader.

Drivers of Polarization

Let’s shift gears to what drives polarization. Looking at U.S. trends since the 1960s, the literature points to several familiar themes:

• • Economic inequality: The growing gap between rich and poor (McCarty et al., 2007; Zacher, 2024).
  • Racial issues: A key driver in the U.S. (McAdam, 2015).
  • Partisan realignment: Spurred by economic inequality and civil rights movements (Highton, 2020; Kuziemko & Washington, 2018).
  • Media fragmentation: The rise of ideologically selective media (Prior, 2005; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).
  • Geographic sorting: Americans increasingly live near like-minded neighbors (Cho et al., 2013).
  • Uncompetitive districts: Less competition leads to more extreme partisanship (Stonecash et al., 2018).

Human Nature and Affect

While these structural factors matter, in my take of the subject if I zoom out: basic human nature and human psychology are the real driving forces.

Most polarization today isn’t driven by ideology but by emotion and affect—a gut-level dislike of “others” (Young & de-Wit, 2024). Party and geographic sorting (Cho et al., 2013) make it easier to identify “them” as “others”, and human nature does the rest. We’re hardwired to distrust outsiders.

This is where Fiorina was looking in the wrong place for polarization.  For many, politics is not not a well thought set of political ideology or issue stances (Kalmoe, 2020).

Rather for many, politics is driven by a gut reaction and the details are outsourced to elites (Lenz, 2013), who are happy to exploit these emotional divides for power and re-election (Karol, 2015).

Impacts on Governing

The consequences of affective polarization are severe:

1. Growing contempt: Americans increasingly distrust “others” (Geiger, 2014).
2. Exaggerated perceptions: We overestimate how extreme our opponents’ positions really are (Lees & Cikara, 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2021).
3. Declining cooperation: Dislike makes compromise nearly impossible (Geiger, 2014b).
4. Government dysfunction: Legislative gridlock is the norm (Binder, 2004).
5. Eroding trust: Polarization harms trust in government (American Academy, 2023), media (Shearer, 2024), and even each other (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2017; Lee, 2022).
6. Risk of violence: At its extreme , polarization creates “an environment in which political violence is more socially acceptable and frequent”  (Piazza, 2023).

What’s Next?

Can anything be done about polarization?  Can we stop this polarization?  Is the current polariation any worse than the polarization seen pre-1960?  All questions for another blog post.

I’ve briefly touched on this topic before in What is the Solution to Extreme Divisiveness? You can check it out here. Spoiler: one solution might involve sharing scotch with someone you disagree with.

But what’s next topic deserves another deep dive. Stay tuned.

Previous Blog Posts on Polarization

• • Does Policy really matter in political campaigns?
  • Vibe Check: Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology
  • Do Americans Really Care About ‘Democracy’?
  • Hyper-partisanship & Hyper-polarization : America’s Pending Divorce 
  • Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief 
  • Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger? Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition
  • What is the solution to extreme divisiveness? 

References

Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American democracy. Yale University Press.

Binder, S. A. (2004). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Brookings Institution.

Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2013). Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(4), 856–870.

Highton, B. (2020). The cultural realignment of state white electorates in the 21st century. Political Behavior, 42(4), 1319–1341. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09590-5

Distrust, political polarization, and America’s challenged institutions. (2023, May 17). American Academy of Arts & Sciences; Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/news/distrust-political-polarization-and-americas-challenged-institutions

Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2011). Culture war? The myth of a polarized America (3rd ed.). Pearson.

Geiger, A. (2014, June 12). Political polarization in the American public. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public

Geiger, A. (2014b, June 12). Section 4: Political compromise and divisive policy debates. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisive-policy-debates/

Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2017). Political trust and polarization. In E. M. Uslaner (Ed.), Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.15

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. The Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x

Kalmoe, N. P. (2020). Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 41(4), 771–794.

Karol, D. (2015). Party activists, interest groups, and polarization in American politics. In American Gridlock (pp. 68–85). Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, I., & Washington, E. (2018). Why did the Democrats lose the South? Bringing new data to an old debate. American Economic Review, 108(10), 2830–2867. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161413

Lee, A. H.-Y. (2022). Social trust in polarized times: How perceptions of political polarization affect Americans’ trust in each other. Political Behavior, 44(3), 1533–1554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09787-1

Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2020). Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(3), 279–286. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

Lenz, G. S. (2013). Follow the leader?: How voters respond to politicians’ policies and performance. University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. (2015). Be careful what you wish for: The ironic connection between the Civil Rights struggle and today’s divided America. Sociological Forum (Randolph, N.J.), 30(S1), 485–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12173

Piazza, J. A. (2023). Political polarization and political violence. Security Studies, 32(3), 476–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780

Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches. (2007). In Choice Reviews Online (Vol. 44, Issue 06, pp. 44-3551-44–3551). American Library Association. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-3551

Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x

Ruggeri, K., Većkalov, B., Bojanić, L., Andersen, T. L., Ashcroft-Jones, S., Ayacaxli, N., Barea-Arroyo, P., Berge, M. L., Bjørndal, L. D., Bursalıoğlu, A., Bühler, V., Čadek, M., Çetinçelik, M., Clay, G., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Damnjanović, K., Dugue, T. M., Esberg, M., Esteban-Serna, C., … Folke, T. (2021). The general fault in our fault lines. Nature Human Behaviour, 5(10), 1369–1380. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01092-x

Shearer, E. (2024, October 10). Americans’ views of 2024 election news. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/

Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD. (n.d.). Apa.org. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.apa.org/news/podcasts/speaking-of-psychology/political-divide

Stonecash, J. M., Brewer, M. D., & Mariani, M. D. (2018). Diverging parties: Social change, realignment, and party polarization. Routledge.

Young, D. J., & de-Wit, L. H. (2024). Affective polarization within parties. Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973

Zacher, S. (2024). Polarization of the rich: The new Democratic allegiance of affluent Americans and the politics of redistribution. Perspectives on Politics, 22(2), 338–356. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722003310

Introduction

Political incivility—rude and disrespectful rhetoric—has become a hallmark of populist campaigns.

This study by Vargiu and colleagues investigates whether (and under what conditions) such tactics are effective in persuasion or influence and whether personality traits or populist attitudes make people more receptive to this behavior.

Current Understanding of Research (Before This Study)

Prior to this research, incivility in political communication was widely assumed to reduce a message’s effectiveness. Studies have shown that:

• • • Negative Reactions to Incivility: People tend to view uncivil rhetoric as unprofessional and damaging to a candidate’s credibility.
    • Limited Persuasion: Civility is often believed to enhance a message’s appeal, making audiences more likely to engage with the content.
    • Partisan Bias: Some evidence suggests people are more forgiving of incivility when it comes from their own political group, although this finding has been inconsistent.

This new study seeks to clarify whether these assumptions hold true across different cultures and personality types.

Methodology

The researchers conducted two experimental studies:

1. 1. 1. Switzerland Study: 1,340 participants.
      2. United States Study: 1,820 participants.

Design: A 2×2 factorial experiment exposed participants to persuasive messages about controversial topics (e.g., gender-related policies). Messages were framed as either:

• • • Civil or Uncivil: Respectful versus disrespectful language.
    • Congruent or Incongruent: Aligning with or opposing participants’ initial beliefs.

Independent Variable: Civility of the message.
Dependent Variable: Change in opinion, measured on a scale from -10 (maximum backfire) to +10 (full persuasion).
Moderators: Populist attitudes and personality traits, including psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism.

Participants’ opinions were measured before and after exposure to determine how persuasive each message was.

Results and Findings

General Impact of Incivility

• • • Incivility Doesn’t Always Backfire: Across both countries, uncivil and civil messages were equally persuasive on average. This challenges the assumption that incivility universally harms credibility.
    • Message Congruence Matters: In Switzerland, uncivil messages aligned with participants’ beliefs were slightly less persuasive than civil ones. However, incongruent messages (those challenging beliefs) were more persuasive, regardless of civility.

Cultural Differences

• • • In the U.S., populist attitudes significantly increased the persuasiveness of uncivil messages, especially those that were incongruent with prior beliefs.
    • In Switzerland, where political discourse is more consensus-driven, uncivil messages were less influential overall.

Role of Personality Traits

• • • Populist Attitudes: U.S. participants with stronger populist leanings were more likely to find uncivil messages persuasive.
    • Dark Traits: People with higher levels of psychopathy and Machiavellianism responded more positively to uncivil messages, particularly when the messages contradicted their initial views.

Critiques of the Research or Additional Areas of Study

While groundbreaking, the study has some limitations:

1. Cultural Specificity: Results varied between Switzerland and the U.S., limiting generalizability to other countries or political systems.
2. Definition of Incivility: The study operationalized incivility as explicit disrespect or vulgarity, which may not capture subtler forms like sarcasm or passive aggression.
3. Medium of Communication: The research used text-based platforms like forums and tweets, which may not reflect how incivility operates in live debates or multimedia formats.  Step away from the keyboard and say it to my face!

Future research could explore:

• Broader definitions of incivility and their impact.
• Different communication channels (e.g., televised debates, social media videos).
• How incivility interacts with audience demographics beyond personality traits.
• How incivility interacts with source credibility.  

Conclusion

As my momma always said: “Jerks of a feather always flock together!”.  Okay, she has never said this, but she did warn me to take care of who I surround myself with.

Incivility isn’t universally persuasive, but it resonates with certain audiences, particularly individuals with populist attitudes or darker personality traits.

This suggests that while uncivil rhetoric can be a risky strategy, it may yield rewards in specific cultural and psychological contexts.

For political strategists, this research highlights the importance of tailoring communication styles to the audience.

For the rest of us, it raises an uncomfortable question: Are we more influenced by insults than we’d like to admit?

Clearly, the answer for some is “damn right, jerkface!”

Introduction

Before and after every election cycle, I revisit a particular academic paper by Hans Noel. Written in 2010, it continues to hold up remarkably well, probably because it challenges all the flashy, data-driven assumptions that dominate political talk today. The title alone—Ten Things Political Scientists Know That You Don’t—is a bit smug, maybe even condescending, but that’s part of what makes it appealing.

Noel’s paper pulls back the curtain on some essential truths that often get overlooked or lost amid the noise of campaign headlines, data deep dives, and daily polling. Sometimes it’s valuable to step back from the latest regression analysis and re-ground ourselves in a few fundamentals.

Noel’s work is a reminder that political science has uncovered a set of counterintuitive findings that challenge what pundits and conventional wisdom claim to know. These insights, while occasionally dry or detached, offer a more grounded way of understanding our political reality.

Let’s dive into these ten insights and then explore a few things we admit we don’t know.

Dr. Noel writes a bit more detail about each of the the ten things political scientists know, I will do my best to summarize each.  (I do recommend reading the full paper.  It’s not dense and is accessible.)

Ten Things Political Scientists “Know”

1. It’s the Fundamentals, Not the Campaigns

The first point Noel raises is one of the most sobering: campaigns are not as influential as we think. Economic conditions, the incumbent party’s time in power, and other macro factors often predict election outcomes more accurately than any catchy slogan or debate zinger. That’s not to say campaigns are meaningless, but in presidential elections especially, the fundamentals make all the difference​.

See : Do Campaigns Really Matter?

2. The “Will of the People” Is Hard to Pin Down

Political commentators love to speak for “the American people,” as though they’re a unified, like-minded entity. In reality, public opinion is fragmented, inconsistent, and shaped by all kinds of outside influences. Most voters lack firm ideological stances and often just follow party cues. So, while we believe in the “will of the people,” it’s often an oversimplified idea​.

3. The Will of the People Might Not Even Exist

Even if we could measure public opinion perfectly, it wouldn’t necessarily add up to a coherent “will of the people.” Kenneth Arrow’s famous theorem showed that it’s nearly impossible to perfectly aggregate everyone’s preferences into a fair and consistent choice. For every voting system, there will be contradictions that make a unified “will” unrealistic. This doesn’t mean democracy doesn’t work; it just means it’s a messier, more imperfect process than we’d like to admit​.

4. There’s No Such Thing as a Mandate

Winning an election doesn’t necessarily mean voters support everything you stand for. Outcomes are heavily influenced by macro factors (like the economy), and election “mandates” are often narratives created after the fact to suit political agendas. Claims of a mandate are usually wishful thinking at best and oversimplifications at worst​.

See: Relax, overheating in politics is normal!

5. Duverger’s Law and the Two-Party System

The U.S. voting system naturally favors two dominant parties, thanks to the single-ballot, simple-majority format. This effect, known as Duverger’s Law, is why third parties rarely break through, even if they have significant support. Political structures, not just voter preferences, make it almost impossible for third parties to win in a meaningful way.

See:  Will there ever be a “multi-party” system (i.e. 5-10 parties) or are we stuck here?

See also: Why don’t third parties win US presidential elections?

6. Partisanship Is Powerful

Despite the reverence for “independent” voters, most people who identify as independents actually lean toward one party and act accordingly. True independents make up a small and often disengaged portion of the electorate. This reveals that partisan loyalty runs deeper than we might think, even among those who claim neutrality.

See:  Affective Partisanship – Why do you hate me?

7. Special Interests Aren’t So Special

When I ask my students “What is the difference between an interest group and special interest group?”  They normally blink at me until I answer my own question – “A special interest group is an interest group we don’t like or agree with!”

When politicians blame “special interests” for political gridlock, it’s a convenient dodge. Special interests aren’t inherently bad; they’re just organized groups with specific agendas, often representing a legitimate slice of society. Democracy thrives on these factions, as James Madison argued. Labeling them as “special” only obscures their role in the broader system​.

8. Grassroots Movements Need Leaders & Money

No political movement is entirely spontaneous. While grassroots organizations appear to spring up from the ground, they require leadership, coordination, and resources to mobilize people and sustain their efforts. This doesn’t make them “astroturf” or inauthentic; it’s simply how organized politics works.

Grassroots operations are time and resource intensive and rarely if ever truly organic

9. Most Independents Are Actually Partisans

Here’s a repeat offender: independents. While they get touted as thoughtful, nonpartisan voters, most independents vote predictably along party lines. Research shows that “leaning” independents behave like committed partisans, undermining the narrative that they hold the balance of power in most elections.

I beg people to stop when in a minority party situation saying “All I need to do is win all the Independents….”

See: So, You Want to Run As an Independent or Third-Party Candidate?

10. Political Science Embraces Uncertainty

Finally, political science acknowledges what it doesn’t know. Academics are often reluctant to declare absolutes, recognizing that our understanding of politics is always evolving. Unfortunately, the media does a poor job of conveying the inherent uncertainty involved in studying human behavior.

This nuance and cautious approach may be frustrating for those looking for clear answers, but it reflects an honest acknowledgment of how much more there is to discover.

Open Questions in Political Science

While Noel’s ten points provide a solid foundation, there are plenty of unanswered questions in political science that researchers continue to explore. Here are a few of the most pressing:

The Local Campaign Question

Campaigns might not matter as much at the national level, but what about at the state and local levels? It’s possible that campaign tactics are more effective in smaller races where local issues and candidate interactions carry more weight. Research is still catching up on how these factors play out in non-presidential elections.

Breaking the Two-Party System

Duverger’s Law suggests that the two-party system is here to stay, but could changes to voting rules (like ranked-choice voting) actually shift the balance? Political scientists are watching closely to see if these reforms have the potential to shake up party dominance in a meaningful way.  In Florida ranked-choice voting has been banned, and my initial exploration of it concluded with me not being a fan.

see: Ranked Choice Voting – a final verdict and a “Winner”

Improving Public Opinion Measurements

Public opinion polling has significant limitations, often influenced by question phrasing, social context, and methodology.

Future methodologies might better capture the nuances of opinion. Until then, poll results will only tell part of the story (and don’t forget the uncertainty).

Long-Term Effects of Media Fragmentation

How do social media and increasingly fragmented, siloed media landscapes influence voting and political engagement over time? Do they lead to more polarization, or can they encourage more diverse perspectives? This question remains open as researchers study the effects of information ecosystems on political attitudes and behavior.

How Can Polarization Be Reduced in Democracies?

Extreme partisanship and polarization are pervasive issues that threaten the functionality of democratic systems, but the best ways to counter polarization remain elusive.

Could structural reforms—such as open primaries, run-offs or nonpartisan redistricting—make a measurable impact? Or are deeper cultural and educational changes needed to bridge divides? This is a question at the forefront of modern political science research.

A wrinkle:  Is being polarized all that new?  Maybe the default for the American public is polarization?

What Persuasion Techniques Are Most Effective at Changing Voter Behavior?

Political campaigns invest heavily in persuasion tactics, from targeted ads to social media strategies, but we still don’t fully understand which techniques genuinely sway voters or change their behavior short-term and especially long-term.  And remember there is a difference between behavior and belief change.

Is it more effective to appeal to emotions, reinforce group identities, or focus on policy information?  (I believe an emotional appeal from in-group)  And are certain tactics more impactful for undecided voters than for strong partisans? Is there a way to do deep canvasing “at scale?”  Political scientists are investigating the complex interaction between messaging, voter psychology, and the media to determine what truly moves the needle in an era of information and disinformation overload.

Effectiveness of emerging technologies?

There are some fascinating emerging technologies on the horizon. Recently, I spoke with an AI company that claimed if we provided them with a detailed breakdown of target participants for a focus group, they could generate AI bots to conduct the group. These bots would test messaging, ads, and even ask participants for explanations. It sounds almost blasphemous, I know—but if we’re all living in a simulation, who’s to say it’s out of the realm of possibility?

In addition, we must continue to evaluate polling methodolgies, especially in multi-modal collection scenarios.

Conclusion

The title Ten Things Political Scientists Know That You Don’t comes off as arrogant, but clickbait titles are all the rage now, and Noel’s insights give us a rare peek behind the curtain at the hidden rules and norms that shape our political system. Political science, far from just academic jargon, is a discipline that seeks to decode these complexities and challenge the oversimplified narratives we often hear.

Of course, political scientists aren’t exactly unified. You haven’t seen a real clash until two scholars with big egos and bigger opinions go head-to-head on a disputed finding. Significant disagreements exist within the field, and many of these findings carry their own uncertainties and caveats.

But, the field is “humble” enough to acknowledge there remains things we don’t know or may never know.

Yet, Noel’s work reminds us that a deeper, more nuanced view of politics—one that embraces messiness, ambiguity, and contradiction—ultimately brings us closer to the truth.

It’s a call to go beyond hot-take, pundit-driven narratives and engage with the underlying realities that govern political life.

I’ve gotten myself into trouble before with sweeping statements like, “Policy doesn’t matter…It’s the emotions, stupid!”

Off-stage or after a classroom lecture, I always end up regretting after I do it because, well, it just sounds wrong—like I’m ignoring all the nuance and context.

So, I’ll revise: “Policy doesn’t matter much, except for a select few. For the rest—it’s the emotions & vibes, stupid!”

We have explored this topic previously, but this additional study adds more nuance. 

A bit of warning if you read the paper: Kalmoe’s work is dense with methodological details, nuanced findings, and subtle critiques of prior ideological research. I’ve tried my best to rephrase technical content, but in the process, I may have sacrificed a bit of nuance—especially in the Results and Findings section.  As awlays, I urge you to read the source document.

Now, let’s explore the academic research.

Introduction

In political psychology, ideology is a prized concept—often touted as the backbone of people’s political beliefs and decisions. But according to Nathan P. Kalmoe’s research, the story is a bit more complicated.

He suggests that only a small group of highly informed people—roughly 20-30%—actually have coherent, stable ideological beliefs.

The rest? They’re mostly ideologically “innocent,” forming opinions that may be more about social identity, emotions, or party loyalty than deeply held beliefs.

Kalmoe’s work challenges the idea that ideology is widespread and meaningful for most people.

And he takes it a step further, critiquing the way we generalize about ideology based on biased samples and common survey practices. So, does ideology actually structure political beliefs? For most people, maybe not. 

Methodology

Kalmoe used a mix of large representative surveys, including the American National Election Studies (ANES), covering data across four decades with samples ranging from 13,000 to 37,000 U.S. adults.

He also incorporated panel data to test ideological stability over time. The methodology included assessments of common ideology markers, like political values, self-identification, and policy positions, to see if they cohered into a stable ideological structure across knowledge levels.

This was primarily a survey-based study with panel analysis used to determine how consistent ideological beliefs were for each individual.

Results and Findings

Kalmoe’s findings reveal a split in how ideology functions. Here’s the gist:

• Ideology is coherent only for the knowledgeable few: Roughly 20-30% of Americans hold ideologies that consistently influence their political beliefs and decisions. This group—politically informed and engaged—shows stable, coherent ideological orientations.
• For most, ideology is weak or non-existent: The remaining 70-80% of people don’t structure their political beliefs ideologically. Instead, these folks might identify as conservative or liberal without understanding or consistently aligning with the values or policies associated with those labels. In short, they lack ideological coherence and stability.
• Political knowledge plays a big role: Those with higher political knowledge tend to be the ones with stable ideological beliefs. But Kalmoe finds that many people don’t know enough to connect the dots between their beliefs and an ideological framework, limiting ideology’s role for them.
• Partisanship vs. ideology: While ideology might not be widespread, partisanship sure is. Party identification proved to be a much stronger predictor of people’s views than ideological labels, especially for those with lower political knowledge. In practical terms, people might say they’re conservative but only reliably vote Republican because of party loyalty, not ideology.

Critiques of the Current Research

Kalmoe raises important points about the limitations of traditional research on ideology. He argues that relying on convenience samples (like college students or online panels) can skew our understanding of ideology’s strength in the general public. People in these samples tend to be more politically knowledgeable than the average citizen, inflating estimates of ideological coherence.

Kalmoe also suggests that researchers could do better by consistently including political knowledge measures in their studies to separate ideological findings by knowledge level. This approach would help avoid overstating ideology’s influence among the general population.

Conclusion

Kalmoe’s work calls for a reality check: ideology isn’t as common or influential among the general public (AND PRESS) as some might think.

For most people, politics is less about a cohesive ideology and more about simple identities and loyalties.

His findings point to a need for more careful analysis in political psychology, especially when it comes to understanding how (and if) ideology influences the average voter.

Don’t misunderstand me—policy does matter, particularly to those who are politically knowledgeable and to elected officials. However, when it comes to mass ideology, it’s a different story.

In short, for the “ideologically innocent majority”, policy nor your detailed 10 point plan may indeed not matter much. Instead, it’s more about party loyalty, social identity, and, yes—the emotions & vibes, stupid!

Introduction

Ever thought about how much the average voter actually values democracy? Spoiler alert: it’s complicated.

Recently, someone sent me an article from the Atlantic entitled “Only About 3.5 Percent of Americans Care About Democracy (gift link)” and it referenced a study done by two professors from Yale.  

I was a bit surprised by the title and I went in search of the underlying study.  

I found it, and I am going to take some exception to the framing by the Atlantic, but let’s explore.  

While Americans wave the flag and champion “democracy” as the best form of government (even though we are a constitutional republic), researchers Matthew H. Graham and Milan W. Svolik put this concept to the test.

They set out to see if Americans would stand by democratic principles—even if it meant voting against their own political team.

So, let’s dive into what this study uncovers about the strength (or fragility) of democratic support in the U.S.

Methodology

Graham and Svolik used two complementary approaches to assess how willing American voters are to prioritize democracy over partisanship:

Survey Experiment with Hypothetical Candidates: The researchers designed a survey with a nationally representative sample of over 1,600 U.S. voters, asking participants to make choices between pairs of hypothetical candidates. To reflect real electoral scenarios, these candidates were randomly assigned specific party affiliations (Republican or Democrat), policy platforms (economic and social positions), and characteristics (like age, profession, and years of experience).

But here’s the twist: some candidates were also given undemocratic stances, such as supporting a reduction in polling places in areas favorable to the opposition, calling for prosecuting journalists, or endorsing gerrymandering. By mixing these attributes, the researchers could observe whether voters were more inclined to reject undemocratic candidates or, alternatively, overlook these behaviors to support their preferred party. Across 16 randomized choice scenarios, each participant revealed just how flexible they were with their commitment to democratic principles.

Natural Experiment in Montana’s 2017 Special Congressional Election: For a real-world angle, the researchers examined Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House, where one candidate notoriously assaulted a journalist shortly before election day. This incident served as a real-world “democracy violation”—a public act against democratic norms. Here’s the clever part: Montana has a large population of absentee voters, many of whom cast their ballots prior to the assault. By comparing absentee votes (pre-assault) with election day votes (post-assault), Graham and Svolik could isolate the impact of this undemocratic incident on voters’ choices. This natural experiment allowed them to test if, given clear evidence of anti-democratic behavior, partisans would still stand by their candidate.

This dual-method approach offered insight into the general principles voters claim to hold in surveys versus the principles they actually apply in real elections. In total, the study captured data from thousands of voter responses, offering a robust look at how flexible (or inflexible) Americans are when democracy itself is on the line.

Results and Findings

The findings might surprise you—or not, if you’re a realist about American politics. Here’s what Graham and Svolik found:

• Party Over Principle: A solid chunk of voters prioritized their party over democratic values, with about 86% of participants sticking with their partisan candidates, even when those candidates opposed democratic principles.
• Centrist Resistance: Political moderates were more likely than extremists to vote against undemocratic candidates, proving a rare pro-democratic force amid strong partisan loyalty.
• Double Standards Across Party Lines: Both Republicans and Democrats showed leniency towards undemocratic behaviors when it came from their own side but were more critical when it came from the opposing party.
• Natural Experiment Results: The Montana election’s results were consistent with the survey experiment: only voters in moderate areas punished the candidate for undemocratic actions, while partisans tended to stay loyal.

Critiques of the Research

While illuminating, this research has some limitations:

Timing: It’s worth noting that this research was conducted in 2018 and published in 2020, before the events surrounding January 6, 2021, and the ensuing media storm, and the 2024 campaign.

When studied, I’m not sure many Americans were seriously pondering threats to our democratic foundations.  This experiment was likely veiwed as more as a  hypothetical than a real, potential threat.

Here’s the question: if this study were repeated post-January 6—after such a seismic event—would we see stronger effects?  Larger partisan effects?  My guess is we would.

Respondents:  I cannot access the study’s appendix due to the paywall. However, based on common practices in academic research, I assume the participants are likely a convenience sample consisting of college-aged students. If this is the case, it’s reasonable to suppose that these students, as part of an academic exercise, would be inclined to downplay hypothetical threats to democracy. This is especially true when compared to more immediate concerns, such as the potential rejection of a date for that weekend.

Generalizability and Election Context: The findings from Montana’s special election might be unique to that context, especially considering the high-profile nature of the event and not generalizable to the entire country.

Conclusion

Writing about academic research is difficult (trust me!), balancing nuance with concise writing is a high wire act.  And the media has the additional need to attract readers meaning typically any nuance gets murdered in the headlines.

This brings us to a key nuance in Graham and Svolik’s study: it’s not that voters are indifferent to democracy, but rather that, in a polarized society, democratic values end up competing with the pull of partisanship and specific policy goals.  They take a back-seat especially if the threat is not salient.  

So, while democratic norms matter to Americans, only a small number are willing to sacrifice their other priorities to defend those norms—especially when it means opposing their own party.

This doesn’t mean that democratic principles don’t matter. However, when this study was conducted, I doubt many Americans felt democracy itself was truly at risk.  The threat was likely some far-off academic hypethtical scenario. 

Since the research and publication, focusing events have likely shifted perspectives, and I suspect future research will show that more than 3.5% of voters truly prioritize democracy.

Though this layered conclusion may sound troubling, it points to a possible path forward. Democratic values are still widely understood and can be made more salient and rise in importance – possibly to the center of our priorities.