So, you’re telling me that people get emotionally charged over politics? NO WAY!

Next, you’ll tell me that Tom doesn’t like Jerry, and the sun rises in the east.

But seriously, how does “affective polarization”—that gut-level emotional attachment where we love our party and loathe the other—affect what we believe? It turns out, it’s not just about cheering for your team; it might also mean believing whatever makes your side look good, even if it’s, well, a bit shaky on the facts.

Given the swirl of misinformation around FEMA’s hurricane response lately, I wanted to dig deeper into our previous exploration of affective polarization and explore how affective polarization shapes what people accept as truth.

Let’s explore some additional academic research that digs further into this phenomenon!

Introduction

The study by Libby Jenke focuses on how political party loyalty (affective polarization) influences our belief in misinformation, especially when the misinformation aligns with our own party.

Affective polarization has already been blamed for various social ills—like ruining Thanksgiving dinners—but what about its effects on political beliefs?

This paper argues that those who are highly polarized are more likely to believe misinformation that favors their party and dismiss information that favors the opposition.

Methodology

The study uses data from two sources: the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, both survey-based studies with large sample sizes (5104 and 6352 respondents, respectively). Jenke also conducted a survey experiment where participants played a game designed to increase or decrease their level of affective polarization. By comparing these responses, the study explores whether heightened polarization causes greater belief in misinformation.

Results and Findings

Here’s where it gets interesting. The research confirmed that affective polarization indeed makes people more likely to believe misinformation that supports their party’s narrative.

If you’re deeply emotionally invested in your political party, you’re more inclined to believe information—even false information—that makes your side look good. On the flip side, you’re more likely to reject anything that might put your opponents in a positive light, even if it’s true.

This pattern held for both Democrats and Republicans, with one caveat: political sophistication (meaning how much someone knows about politics) doesn’t help. In fact, more politically knowledgeable folks are just better at rationalizing their party’s misinformation.  

“Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it,” (Jenke 2023, p 825)

For example, Republicans were more likely to believe misinformation about illegal voting in the 2016 election and less likely to believe in Russian interference. Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that Trump deported more unauthorized immigrants than Obama—an inaccuracy.

The study found that increased affective polarization was a significant predictor of believing in-party-congruent misinformation and disbelieving out-party-congruent misinformation.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

While the study does a solid job of linking affective polarization to misinformation belief, it doesn’t fully explore why political sophistication exacerbates the problem instead of mitigating it. Shouldn’t smarter people know better?

Another area for future study is how to break the cycle of polarization. The paper suggests that simply educating people more might not be enough—after all, the more politically savvy you are, the better you are at confirming your biases.

Moreover, the study’s focus on U.S. political dynamics raises questions about whether these findings would hold in other countries with different political structures or levels of polarization.

An interesting future study could explore these findings in a multi-party system to see if those citizens experience the same patterns.

Conclusion

In summary, the study adds to a growing body of research showing that our political loyalties don’t just affect how we vote—they can also cloud our judgment on what’s true and what’s false. And the scariest part? The more sophisticated we are, the better we become at finding reasons to cling to misinformation that favors our side. If you’re hoping that a Masters or PhD  degree will save democracy from misinformation… it might be time to adjust those expectations. There you have it: political polarization isn’t just dividing us socially, it’s influencing how we see reality itself. In this age of misinformation, understanding this dynamic is more important than ever. Stay skeptical, folks!

Title: Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition

Link: Affective Polarization Within Parties (2024)

Peer Review Status: Peer Reviewed

Citation (APSA format):
Young, David J. and Lee H. de-Wit. 2024. “Affective Polarization Within Parties.” Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973.

Introduction

Affective polarization—where we like our political tribe and dislike the opposing one—has been on the rise.

But unsurpingly: polarization doesn’t stop at the party line. Young and de-Wit (2024) dive into how this dislike festers within parties themselves.

In this paper, they focused on the U.S. and the U.K. to investigate if political factions within parties (think progressive vs. centrist Democrats or pro- and anti-Brexit Conservatives) can stir up as much, or more, animosity than traditional partisan battles.

Methodology

This paper contains the results of two studies:  One conducted using data from Great Britian, the second a stand alone study conducted within the US. 

Study 1 (Great Britain)

Young and de-Wit began by examining within-party polarization in the U.K. They embedded questions into two waves of an ongoing longitudinal study into polarization
in Great Britain (The MHP Polarization Tracker).

They surveyed British participants who identified with the Labour or Conservative parties. Participants were asked to rate how much they liked factions within their own party (e.g., Labour’s pro-Corbyn vs. pro-Starmer supporters) and factions from the opposing party. In addition, participants provided ratings on traits like kindness and intelligence, and their comfort with having a member of these factions as a friend.

The study involved two waves of data collection: one in February 2022 and another in July 2022. The final sample included over 900 participants in each wave, with analyses focusing on paired-sample t-tests to compare within-party factionalism against between-party polarization. 

Study 2 (United States)

In the U.S. study, the researchers employed a similar methodology but with a focus on American political factions. They surveyed 443 participants, using Prolific,  with Republicans and Democrats rating how they felt toward factions within their own party and in the opposing party. The U.S. factions included, for example, Trump-supporting Republicans versus Cheney-supporting Republicans and Biden-supporting Democrats versus AOC-supporting Democrats.

This study introduced a new dimension: participants were also asked how likely they would be to vote for their party’s presidential candidate if that candidate was from their opposing faction. 

Both studies highlighted how factional identities can sometimes eclipse party identities, leading to stronger negative feelings toward in-party rivals than toward members of opposing parties.

Results and Findings

The study found that within-party polarization is substantial, sometimes rivaling or even exceeding between-party polarization.

In both the U.K. and U.S., participants frequently showed a strong preference for their own faction within the party over rival factions.  

“While within-party affective polarization tends to be weaker than between-party,
it can be just as strong or even stronger in some cases—six of the 14 factions showed a preference for themselves over their in-party rival faction that had an effect at least
as large as a between-party effect in their country” (p. 16)

In Study 1 (Great Britain), participants exhibited significant within-party polarization, particularly among Labour factions. The findings showed that Labour’s factions had higher affective polarization than Conservative factions. For instance, participants who preferred Corbyn rated their faction much more positively than rival factions supporting Starmer, with effect sizes in the moderate-to-large range (p. 9)​ This division was significant enough that many participants preferred an out-party faction, like Brexit-supporting Conservatives, over their in-party rivals (p. 9).

Study 2 (United States) showed similar results. Trump-supporting Republicans had higher levels of affective polarization toward rival factions within their own party, such as those supporting Liz Cheney, compared to Democrats (p. 13). Interestingly, within-party polarization was strongest among Republicans, particularly on controversial issues like Trump’s leadership and the 2020 election results (p. 14)​.

In both studies, there were instances where participants expressed a preference for an out-party faction over their in-party rivals. This was particularly noticeable among Labour supporters in the U.K. and pro-Trump Republicans in the U.S., where the animosity toward in-party rivals exceeded that toward members of the opposing party (p. 9 and p. 15)​.

These findings challenge the notion that political divisions are primarily between parties and suggest that factional disputes within parties can drive as much or more polarization than traditional partisan divides.

Critiques and Areas for Future Study

While this study provides fascinating insights, there are a few limitations. For one, the factions studied were selected based on current high-profile disagreements, which might not capture long-term trends in party divisions. Additionally, while the study focused on significant factional disputes, it’s possible that future research could benefit from examining smaller, less obvious factions to get a fuller picture of within-party polarization.  Asking what does a faction let slide versus go to war over? Another point for future exploration? Investigating how factional identity impacts not just feelings of animosity but actual voting behavior. While the authors performed some additional analysis finding:  “No faction was more likely to vote for an out-party candidate than the candidate from the rival factional , though the Cheney faction was no more likely to vote for Trump than either Biden, “(p. 17) this area remains ripe for additional study. What are the factors that lead to cross over voting and party switches?  Are they push or pull factors? Could factional splits within a party eventually lead to new parties or movements altogether?  Realignments? This research just scratches the surface of that possibility, but is does add some knowledge to a topic derth of research.

It’s that time of year again—oppo dumps, October surprises, and all the drama that comes with them! For years, we’ve been preaching to our clients: “Hang a light on your vulnerabilities before someone else does.” Every time, we hear the same protests: “What if they don’t find it?”—They will. “What if they don’t use it?”—They will. “What if it doesn’t resonate with the public?”—It might.

The smartest move? Own your issues, get ahead of them, and do it early.

This strategy is called inoculation. And guess what? There’s research to back it up!

 

Title: The Relative Effectiveness of Inoculation, Bolstering, and Combined Approaches in Crisis Communication

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1532-754X.2004.11925131

Peer Review Status: Peer Reviewed – Yes

Citation: Wan, H. H., & Fau, P. F. “The Relative Effectiveness of Inoculation, Bolstering, and Combined Approaches in Crisis Communication.” Journal of Applied Communication Research.

Introduction

Crisis communication is a crucial element for organizations or campaigns navigating public relations challenges. In their study, Wan and Fau explore how three distinct approaches—Inoculation, Bolstering, and a Combined Approach—impact crisis communication. By focusing on the effectiveness of each strategy in mitigating negative perceptions, their work highlights the practical tools organizations can employ to better manage public opinion during a crisis.

Some definitions:  

• • • Inoculation – In the context of crisis communication, inoculation is a strategy that involves preemptively addressing potential criticisms or negative information before they arise. 
    • Bolstering – Bolstering is a crisis communication tactic where an organization highlights its positive attributes or past successes to offset negative information.
    • Combined Approach – The Combined Approach in crisis communication merges the strategies of inoculation and bolstering.

Methodology

The study involved a controlled experiment with participants exposed to different crisis communication strategies: Inoculation (pre-emptively addressing potential criticisms), Bolstering (highlighting positive aspects of the organization), and a Combined Approach (integrating both strategies).

The authors measured participant reactions across various scenarios and time points, assessing both immediate and delayed responses to these communication efforts. This design allowed them to determine which strategy had the most lasting impact on audience attitudes and crisis perceptions.

Results and Findings

Wan and Fau’s findings indicate that the Combined Approach—blending both Inoculation and Bolstering—was the most effective at mitigating damage to an organization’s reputation during a crisis.

While Inoculation alone proved useful in preempting negative reactions, it was less effective in generating long-term positive feelings.

Bolstering, on the other hand, helped enhance favorable perceptions but fell short when participants encountered counterarguments.

The Combined Approach, however, provided a balance, reinforcing the organization’s strengths while simultaneously addressing vulnerabilities, resulting in a more resilient public perception.

Critiques of the Research and Additional Areas of Potential Study

While the study presents strong evidence in favor of the Combined Approach, it primarily focuses on short-term crisis management. A critique lies in the lack of long-term analysis beyond the experimental setting.

Future studies could expand this research by examining how these strategies play out in real-world scenarios over extended periods, such as during long-term corporate scandals or political crises.

Moreover, understanding the psychological underpinnings of why the Combined Approach works so effectively could offer deeper insights into communication strategy development.

Conclusion

Wan and Fau’s research provides valuable guidance for organizations seeking to navigate crises more effectively.

Their work underscores the importance of adopting a multifaceted approach that combines proactive and positive messaging.

 Or, simply Hang a Lantern on your problems before someone else does.  

Someone recently asked me why I ditched “Science Fridays”—you know, the fun little deep dives into whatever academic paper caught my eye that week. Honestly? I had no good answer. So, in the spirit of not having a better excuse, we’re bringing it back!

This week, we’re diving into the world of interest groups and how our elected officials may interact with them.

 

Title: Extreme Voices: Interest Groups and the Misrepresentation of Issue Publics

Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24546176

Peer Reviewed:  Yes

ASPA Citation:

Claassen, R. L., & Nicholson, S. P. (2024). Extreme Voices: Interest Groups and the Misrepresentation of Issue Publics. Public Opinion Quarterly.

Introduction

Political ignorance among the general public is often offset by the existence of *issue publics*—citizens who care deeply about specific topics and are well-informed about them. But the big question is whether these engaged citizens accurately represent the broader issue public, especially when they belong to interest groups. Spoiler: they don’t. This paper explores the disconnect between active interest group members and the broader public on policy matters.

Methodology

The study uses two large national surveys—the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) with a sample size of 36,500 and the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). These surveys provided a rare opportunity to query individuals on both their interest group memberships and specific policy preferences. The researchers focused on 10 interest groups across various policy areas, including the NRA, AARP, unions, and advocacy groups like the Sierra Club.

Key demographic characteristics (e.g., gun ownership for the NRA) were used to distinguish group members from nonmembers within each issue public.

Results/Findings

Interest group members consistently express more extreme policy opinions compared to nonmembers in their issue publics. For example, NRA members are much more conservative on gun control than non-NRA gun owners.

This difference holds across nearly all ten groups studied. Importantly, the variation is largely driven by ideology and party identification, rather than other socio-economic factors.

One key finding is that the incentive structure of the interest groups matters. Groups offering expressive benefits (like NARAL) tend to attract more ideologically extreme members, while groups that offer material benefits (like unions) show smaller opinion gaps between members and nonmembers.

Critiques of the Research

While the findings are robust, the study is somewhat limited by its reliance on surveys that don’t always capture the full diversity of interest groups.

The study also focuses primarily on large, national organizations, which might not fully represent local or smaller groups’ dynamics. Furthermore, the mechanism behind why group members hold more extreme views remains speculative.

Additional research could explore how interest group recruitment strategies might further polarize these issue publics or explore the potential differences between national, state, or local levels.

Conclusion

This research makes it clear that interest groups don’t just amplify the voices of the engaged public—they distort them.

Members of these groups are not only more active but more extreme in their policy views, which can skew the perception of public opinion.

This misrepresentation may contribute to increased polarization in policy debates, as lawmakers often look to interest groups for cues on where the public stands on critical issues.

The takeaway? When politicians rely on interest groups to gauge public opinion, they might be getting a distorted view, leading to policy decisions that don’t reflect the broader public’s preferences.

Or “Just be careful not to get too far over your skis”