Introduction

Political incivility—rude and disrespectful rhetoric—has become a hallmark of populist campaigns.

This study by Vargiu and colleagues investigates whether (and under what conditions) such tactics are effective in persuasion or influence and whether personality traits or populist attitudes make people more receptive to this behavior.

Current Understanding of Research (Before This Study)

Prior to this research, incivility in political communication was widely assumed to reduce a message’s effectiveness. Studies have shown that:

• • • Negative Reactions to Incivility: People tend to view uncivil rhetoric as unprofessional and damaging to a candidate’s credibility.
    • Limited Persuasion: Civility is often believed to enhance a message’s appeal, making audiences more likely to engage with the content.
    • Partisan Bias: Some evidence suggests people are more forgiving of incivility when it comes from their own political group, although this finding has been inconsistent.

This new study seeks to clarify whether these assumptions hold true across different cultures and personality types.

Methodology

The researchers conducted two experimental studies:

1. 1. 1. Switzerland Study: 1,340 participants.
      2. United States Study: 1,820 participants.

Design: A 2×2 factorial experiment exposed participants to persuasive messages about controversial topics (e.g., gender-related policies). Messages were framed as either:

• • • Civil or Uncivil: Respectful versus disrespectful language.
    • Congruent or Incongruent: Aligning with or opposing participants’ initial beliefs.

Independent Variable: Civility of the message.
Dependent Variable: Change in opinion, measured on a scale from -10 (maximum backfire) to +10 (full persuasion).
Moderators: Populist attitudes and personality traits, including psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism.

Participants’ opinions were measured before and after exposure to determine how persuasive each message was.

Results and Findings

General Impact of Incivility

• • • Incivility Doesn’t Always Backfire: Across both countries, uncivil and civil messages were equally persuasive on average. This challenges the assumption that incivility universally harms credibility.
    • Message Congruence Matters: In Switzerland, uncivil messages aligned with participants’ beliefs were slightly less persuasive than civil ones. However, incongruent messages (those challenging beliefs) were more persuasive, regardless of civility.

Cultural Differences

• • • In the U.S., populist attitudes significantly increased the persuasiveness of uncivil messages, especially those that were incongruent with prior beliefs.
    • In Switzerland, where political discourse is more consensus-driven, uncivil messages were less influential overall.

Role of Personality Traits

• • • Populist Attitudes: U.S. participants with stronger populist leanings were more likely to find uncivil messages persuasive.
    • Dark Traits: People with higher levels of psychopathy and Machiavellianism responded more positively to uncivil messages, particularly when the messages contradicted their initial views.

Critiques of the Research or Additional Areas of Study

While groundbreaking, the study has some limitations:

1. Cultural Specificity: Results varied between Switzerland and the U.S., limiting generalizability to other countries or political systems.
2. Definition of Incivility: The study operationalized incivility as explicit disrespect or vulgarity, which may not capture subtler forms like sarcasm or passive aggression.
3. Medium of Communication: The research used text-based platforms like forums and tweets, which may not reflect how incivility operates in live debates or multimedia formats.  Step away from the keyboard and say it to my face!

Future research could explore:

• Broader definitions of incivility and their impact.
• Different communication channels (e.g., televised debates, social media videos).
• How incivility interacts with audience demographics beyond personality traits.
• How incivility interacts with source credibility.  

Conclusion

As my momma always said: “Jerks of a feather always flock together!”.  Okay, she has never said this, but she did warn me to take care of who I surround myself with.

Incivility isn’t universally persuasive, but it resonates with certain audiences, particularly individuals with populist attitudes or darker personality traits.

This suggests that while uncivil rhetoric can be a risky strategy, it may yield rewards in specific cultural and psychological contexts.

For political strategists, this research highlights the importance of tailoring communication styles to the audience.

For the rest of us, it raises an uncomfortable question: Are we more influenced by insults than we’d like to admit?

Clearly, the answer for some is “damn right, jerkface!”

Introduction

Before and after every election cycle, I revisit a particular academic paper by Hans Noel. Written in 2010, it continues to hold up remarkably well, probably because it challenges all the flashy, data-driven assumptions that dominate political talk today. The title alone—Ten Things Political Scientists Know That You Don’t—is a bit smug, maybe even condescending, but that’s part of what makes it appealing.

Noel’s paper pulls back the curtain on some essential truths that often get overlooked or lost amid the noise of campaign headlines, data deep dives, and daily polling. Sometimes it’s valuable to step back from the latest regression analysis and re-ground ourselves in a few fundamentals.

Noel’s work is a reminder that political science has uncovered a set of counterintuitive findings that challenge what pundits and conventional wisdom claim to know. These insights, while occasionally dry or detached, offer a more grounded way of understanding our political reality.

Let’s dive into these ten insights and then explore a few things we admit we don’t know.

Dr. Noel writes a bit more detail about each of the the ten things political scientists know, I will do my best to summarize each.  (I do recommend reading the full paper.  It’s not dense and is accessible.)

Ten Things Political Scientists “Know”

1. It’s the Fundamentals, Not the Campaigns

The first point Noel raises is one of the most sobering: campaigns are not as influential as we think. Economic conditions, the incumbent party’s time in power, and other macro factors often predict election outcomes more accurately than any catchy slogan or debate zinger. That’s not to say campaigns are meaningless, but in presidential elections especially, the fundamentals make all the difference​.

See : Do Campaigns Really Matter?

2. The “Will of the People” Is Hard to Pin Down

Political commentators love to speak for “the American people,” as though they’re a unified, like-minded entity. In reality, public opinion is fragmented, inconsistent, and shaped by all kinds of outside influences. Most voters lack firm ideological stances and often just follow party cues. So, while we believe in the “will of the people,” it’s often an oversimplified idea​.

3. The Will of the People Might Not Even Exist

Even if we could measure public opinion perfectly, it wouldn’t necessarily add up to a coherent “will of the people.” Kenneth Arrow’s famous theorem showed that it’s nearly impossible to perfectly aggregate everyone’s preferences into a fair and consistent choice. For every voting system, there will be contradictions that make a unified “will” unrealistic. This doesn’t mean democracy doesn’t work; it just means it’s a messier, more imperfect process than we’d like to admit​.

4. There’s No Such Thing as a Mandate

Winning an election doesn’t necessarily mean voters support everything you stand for. Outcomes are heavily influenced by macro factors (like the economy), and election “mandates” are often narratives created after the fact to suit political agendas. Claims of a mandate are usually wishful thinking at best and oversimplifications at worst​.

See: Relax, overheating in politics is normal!

5. Duverger’s Law and the Two-Party System

The U.S. voting system naturally favors two dominant parties, thanks to the single-ballot, simple-majority format. This effect, known as Duverger’s Law, is why third parties rarely break through, even if they have significant support. Political structures, not just voter preferences, make it almost impossible for third parties to win in a meaningful way.

See:  Will there ever be a “multi-party” system (i.e. 5-10 parties) or are we stuck here?

See also: Why don’t third parties win US presidential elections?

6. Partisanship Is Powerful

Despite the reverence for “independent” voters, most people who identify as independents actually lean toward one party and act accordingly. True independents make up a small and often disengaged portion of the electorate. This reveals that partisan loyalty runs deeper than we might think, even among those who claim neutrality.

See:  Affective Partisanship – Why do you hate me?

7. Special Interests Aren’t So Special

When I ask my students “What is the difference between an interest group and special interest group?”  They normally blink at me until I answer my own question – “A special interest group is an interest group we don’t like or agree with!”

When politicians blame “special interests” for political gridlock, it’s a convenient dodge. Special interests aren’t inherently bad; they’re just organized groups with specific agendas, often representing a legitimate slice of society. Democracy thrives on these factions, as James Madison argued. Labeling them as “special” only obscures their role in the broader system​.

8. Grassroots Movements Need Leaders & Money

No political movement is entirely spontaneous. While grassroots organizations appear to spring up from the ground, they require leadership, coordination, and resources to mobilize people and sustain their efforts. This doesn’t make them “astroturf” or inauthentic; it’s simply how organized politics works.

Grassroots operations are time and resource intensive and rarely if ever truly organic

9. Most Independents Are Actually Partisans

Here’s a repeat offender: independents. While they get touted as thoughtful, nonpartisan voters, most independents vote predictably along party lines. Research shows that “leaning” independents behave like committed partisans, undermining the narrative that they hold the balance of power in most elections.

I beg people to stop when in a minority party situation saying “All I need to do is win all the Independents….”

See: So, You Want to Run As an Independent or Third-Party Candidate?

10. Political Science Embraces Uncertainty

Finally, political science acknowledges what it doesn’t know. Academics are often reluctant to declare absolutes, recognizing that our understanding of politics is always evolving. Unfortunately, the media does a poor job of conveying the inherent uncertainty involved in studying human behavior.

This nuance and cautious approach may be frustrating for those looking for clear answers, but it reflects an honest acknowledgment of how much more there is to discover.

Open Questions in Political Science

While Noel’s ten points provide a solid foundation, there are plenty of unanswered questions in political science that researchers continue to explore. Here are a few of the most pressing:

The Local Campaign Question

Campaigns might not matter as much at the national level, but what about at the state and local levels? It’s possible that campaign tactics are more effective in smaller races where local issues and candidate interactions carry more weight. Research is still catching up on how these factors play out in non-presidential elections.

Breaking the Two-Party System

Duverger’s Law suggests that the two-party system is here to stay, but could changes to voting rules (like ranked-choice voting) actually shift the balance? Political scientists are watching closely to see if these reforms have the potential to shake up party dominance in a meaningful way.  In Florida ranked-choice voting has been banned, and my initial exploration of it concluded with me not being a fan.

see: Ranked Choice Voting – a final verdict and a “Winner”

Improving Public Opinion Measurements

Public opinion polling has significant limitations, often influenced by question phrasing, social context, and methodology.

Future methodologies might better capture the nuances of opinion. Until then, poll results will only tell part of the story (and don’t forget the uncertainty).

Long-Term Effects of Media Fragmentation

How do social media and increasingly fragmented, siloed media landscapes influence voting and political engagement over time? Do they lead to more polarization, or can they encourage more diverse perspectives? This question remains open as researchers study the effects of information ecosystems on political attitudes and behavior.

How Can Polarization Be Reduced in Democracies?

Extreme partisanship and polarization are pervasive issues that threaten the functionality of democratic systems, but the best ways to counter polarization remain elusive.

Could structural reforms—such as open primaries, run-offs or nonpartisan redistricting—make a measurable impact? Or are deeper cultural and educational changes needed to bridge divides? This is a question at the forefront of modern political science research.

A wrinkle:  Is being polarized all that new?  Maybe the default for the American public is polarization?

What Persuasion Techniques Are Most Effective at Changing Voter Behavior?

Political campaigns invest heavily in persuasion tactics, from targeted ads to social media strategies, but we still don’t fully understand which techniques genuinely sway voters or change their behavior short-term and especially long-term.  And remember there is a difference between behavior and belief change.

Is it more effective to appeal to emotions, reinforce group identities, or focus on policy information?  (I believe an emotional appeal from in-group)  And are certain tactics more impactful for undecided voters than for strong partisans? Is there a way to do deep canvasing “at scale?”  Political scientists are investigating the complex interaction between messaging, voter psychology, and the media to determine what truly moves the needle in an era of information and disinformation overload.

Effectiveness of emerging technologies?

There are some fascinating emerging technologies on the horizon. Recently, I spoke with an AI company that claimed if we provided them with a detailed breakdown of target participants for a focus group, they could generate AI bots to conduct the group. These bots would test messaging, ads, and even ask participants for explanations. It sounds almost blasphemous, I know—but if we’re all living in a simulation, who’s to say it’s out of the realm of possibility?

In addition, we must continue to evaluate polling methodolgies, especially in multi-modal collection scenarios.

Conclusion

The title Ten Things Political Scientists Know That You Don’t comes off as arrogant, but clickbait titles are all the rage now, and Noel’s insights give us a rare peek behind the curtain at the hidden rules and norms that shape our political system. Political science, far from just academic jargon, is a discipline that seeks to decode these complexities and challenge the oversimplified narratives we often hear.

Of course, political scientists aren’t exactly unified. You haven’t seen a real clash until two scholars with big egos and bigger opinions go head-to-head on a disputed finding. Significant disagreements exist within the field, and many of these findings carry their own uncertainties and caveats.

But, the field is “humble” enough to acknowledge there remains things we don’t know or may never know.

Yet, Noel’s work reminds us that a deeper, more nuanced view of politics—one that embraces messiness, ambiguity, and contradiction—ultimately brings us closer to the truth.

It’s a call to go beyond hot-take, pundit-driven narratives and engage with the underlying realities that govern political life.

I’ve gotten myself into trouble before with sweeping statements like, “Policy doesn’t matter…It’s the emotions, stupid!”

Off-stage or after a classroom lecture, I always end up regretting after I do it because, well, it just sounds wrong—like I’m ignoring all the nuance and context.

So, I’ll revise: “Policy doesn’t matter much, except for a select few. For the rest—it’s the emotions & vibes, stupid!”

We have explored this topic previously, but this additional study adds more nuance. 

A bit of warning if you read the paper: Kalmoe’s work is dense with methodological details, nuanced findings, and subtle critiques of prior ideological research. I’ve tried my best to rephrase technical content, but in the process, I may have sacrificed a bit of nuance—especially in the Results and Findings section.  As awlays, I urge you to read the source document.

Now, let’s explore the academic research.

Introduction

In political psychology, ideology is a prized concept—often touted as the backbone of people’s political beliefs and decisions. But according to Nathan P. Kalmoe’s research, the story is a bit more complicated.

He suggests that only a small group of highly informed people—roughly 20-30%—actually have coherent, stable ideological beliefs.

The rest? They’re mostly ideologically “innocent,” forming opinions that may be more about social identity, emotions, or party loyalty than deeply held beliefs.

Kalmoe’s work challenges the idea that ideology is widespread and meaningful for most people.

And he takes it a step further, critiquing the way we generalize about ideology based on biased samples and common survey practices. So, does ideology actually structure political beliefs? For most people, maybe not. 

Methodology

Kalmoe used a mix of large representative surveys, including the American National Election Studies (ANES), covering data across four decades with samples ranging from 13,000 to 37,000 U.S. adults.

He also incorporated panel data to test ideological stability over time. The methodology included assessments of common ideology markers, like political values, self-identification, and policy positions, to see if they cohered into a stable ideological structure across knowledge levels.

This was primarily a survey-based study with panel analysis used to determine how consistent ideological beliefs were for each individual.

Results and Findings

Kalmoe’s findings reveal a split in how ideology functions. Here’s the gist:

• Ideology is coherent only for the knowledgeable few: Roughly 20-30% of Americans hold ideologies that consistently influence their political beliefs and decisions. This group—politically informed and engaged—shows stable, coherent ideological orientations.
• For most, ideology is weak or non-existent: The remaining 70-80% of people don’t structure their political beliefs ideologically. Instead, these folks might identify as conservative or liberal without understanding or consistently aligning with the values or policies associated with those labels. In short, they lack ideological coherence and stability.
• Political knowledge plays a big role: Those with higher political knowledge tend to be the ones with stable ideological beliefs. But Kalmoe finds that many people don’t know enough to connect the dots between their beliefs and an ideological framework, limiting ideology’s role for them.
• Partisanship vs. ideology: While ideology might not be widespread, partisanship sure is. Party identification proved to be a much stronger predictor of people’s views than ideological labels, especially for those with lower political knowledge. In practical terms, people might say they’re conservative but only reliably vote Republican because of party loyalty, not ideology.

Critiques of the Current Research

Kalmoe raises important points about the limitations of traditional research on ideology. He argues that relying on convenience samples (like college students or online panels) can skew our understanding of ideology’s strength in the general public. People in these samples tend to be more politically knowledgeable than the average citizen, inflating estimates of ideological coherence.

Kalmoe also suggests that researchers could do better by consistently including political knowledge measures in their studies to separate ideological findings by knowledge level. This approach would help avoid overstating ideology’s influence among the general population.

Conclusion

Kalmoe’s work calls for a reality check: ideology isn’t as common or influential among the general public (AND PRESS) as some might think.

For most people, politics is less about a cohesive ideology and more about simple identities and loyalties.

His findings point to a need for more careful analysis in political psychology, especially when it comes to understanding how (and if) ideology influences the average voter.

Don’t misunderstand me—policy does matter, particularly to those who are politically knowledgeable and to elected officials. However, when it comes to mass ideology, it’s a different story.

In short, for the “ideologically innocent majority”, policy nor your detailed 10 point plan may indeed not matter much. Instead, it’s more about party loyalty, social identity, and, yes—the emotions & vibes, stupid!

Introduction

Ever thought about how much the average voter actually values democracy? Spoiler alert: it’s complicated.

Recently, someone sent me an article from the Atlantic entitled “Only About 3.5 Percent of Americans Care About Democracy (gift link)” and it referenced a study done by two professors from Yale.  

I was a bit surprised by the title and I went in search of the underlying study.  

I found it, and I am going to take some exception to the framing by the Atlantic, but let’s explore.  

While Americans wave the flag and champion “democracy” as the best form of government (even though we are a constitutional republic), researchers Matthew H. Graham and Milan W. Svolik put this concept to the test.

They set out to see if Americans would stand by democratic principles—even if it meant voting against their own political team.

So, let’s dive into what this study uncovers about the strength (or fragility) of democratic support in the U.S.

Methodology

Graham and Svolik used two complementary approaches to assess how willing American voters are to prioritize democracy over partisanship:

Survey Experiment with Hypothetical Candidates: The researchers designed a survey with a nationally representative sample of over 1,600 U.S. voters, asking participants to make choices between pairs of hypothetical candidates. To reflect real electoral scenarios, these candidates were randomly assigned specific party affiliations (Republican or Democrat), policy platforms (economic and social positions), and characteristics (like age, profession, and years of experience).

But here’s the twist: some candidates were also given undemocratic stances, such as supporting a reduction in polling places in areas favorable to the opposition, calling for prosecuting journalists, or endorsing gerrymandering. By mixing these attributes, the researchers could observe whether voters were more inclined to reject undemocratic candidates or, alternatively, overlook these behaviors to support their preferred party. Across 16 randomized choice scenarios, each participant revealed just how flexible they were with their commitment to democratic principles.

Natural Experiment in Montana’s 2017 Special Congressional Election: For a real-world angle, the researchers examined Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House, where one candidate notoriously assaulted a journalist shortly before election day. This incident served as a real-world “democracy violation”—a public act against democratic norms. Here’s the clever part: Montana has a large population of absentee voters, many of whom cast their ballots prior to the assault. By comparing absentee votes (pre-assault) with election day votes (post-assault), Graham and Svolik could isolate the impact of this undemocratic incident on voters’ choices. This natural experiment allowed them to test if, given clear evidence of anti-democratic behavior, partisans would still stand by their candidate.

This dual-method approach offered insight into the general principles voters claim to hold in surveys versus the principles they actually apply in real elections. In total, the study captured data from thousands of voter responses, offering a robust look at how flexible (or inflexible) Americans are when democracy itself is on the line.

Results and Findings

The findings might surprise you—or not, if you’re a realist about American politics. Here’s what Graham and Svolik found:

• Party Over Principle: A solid chunk of voters prioritized their party over democratic values, with about 86% of participants sticking with their partisan candidates, even when those candidates opposed democratic principles.
• Centrist Resistance: Political moderates were more likely than extremists to vote against undemocratic candidates, proving a rare pro-democratic force amid strong partisan loyalty.
• Double Standards Across Party Lines: Both Republicans and Democrats showed leniency towards undemocratic behaviors when it came from their own side but were more critical when it came from the opposing party.
• Natural Experiment Results: The Montana election’s results were consistent with the survey experiment: only voters in moderate areas punished the candidate for undemocratic actions, while partisans tended to stay loyal.

Critiques of the Research

While illuminating, this research has some limitations:

Timing: It’s worth noting that this research was conducted in 2018 and published in 2020, before the events surrounding January 6, 2021, and the ensuing media storm, and the 2024 campaign.

When studied, I’m not sure many Americans were seriously pondering threats to our democratic foundations.  This experiment was likely veiwed as more as a  hypothetical than a real, potential threat.

Here’s the question: if this study were repeated post-January 6—after such a seismic event—would we see stronger effects?  Larger partisan effects?  My guess is we would.

Respondents:  I cannot access the study’s appendix due to the paywall. However, based on common practices in academic research, I assume the participants are likely a convenience sample consisting of college-aged students. If this is the case, it’s reasonable to suppose that these students, as part of an academic exercise, would be inclined to downplay hypothetical threats to democracy. This is especially true when compared to more immediate concerns, such as the potential rejection of a date for that weekend.

Generalizability and Election Context: The findings from Montana’s special election might be unique to that context, especially considering the high-profile nature of the event and not generalizable to the entire country.

Conclusion

Writing about academic research is difficult (trust me!), balancing nuance with concise writing is a high wire act.  And the media has the additional need to attract readers meaning typically any nuance gets murdered in the headlines.

This brings us to a key nuance in Graham and Svolik’s study: it’s not that voters are indifferent to democracy, but rather that, in a polarized society, democratic values end up competing with the pull of partisanship and specific policy goals.  They take a back-seat especially if the threat is not salient.  

So, while democratic norms matter to Americans, only a small number are willing to sacrifice their other priorities to defend those norms—especially when it means opposing their own party.

This doesn’t mean that democratic principles don’t matter. However, when this study was conducted, I doubt many Americans felt democracy itself was truly at risk.  The threat was likely some far-off academic hypethtical scenario. 

Since the research and publication, focusing events have likely shifted perspectives, and I suspect future research will show that more than 3.5% of voters truly prioritize democracy.

Though this layered conclusion may sound troubling, it points to a possible path forward. Democratic values are still widely understood and can be made more salient and rise in importance – possibly to the center of our priorities.

Let’s continue our exploration of  polarization.

If you missed some of our previous posts here is a recent list:

• Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief
• Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger?Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition

It’s everywhere, right?

We’ve all been there: scrolling through social media and seeing that one post that makes your blood boil.

You know, the one from your uncle who insists peas bleong in guac (which, by the way, they do not). Or better yet, it’s political — and you’re ready to unfriend or block half of your family and some of your friends over their latest rants.

If you have ever witnessed me speak on politics, you have heard me discuss the overwhelming role emotions and affect play in our political process.  It about emotion, NOT your 10 point detailed policy plan.  PERIOD.

Now, we come across research that explores the question, and guess what – the growing divide between Democrats and Republicans isn’t actually about policy differences.  According to the academic research we’re about to dig into, it’s about affect, not ideology.

Risking confirmation bias and an entire cup of “I told you so”, let’s explore this research.

Introduction

We’ve been told political polarization is all about policy — left vs. right, conservative vs. liberal; and every graduate political science student has had to write a paper on “Just how divided is America, really?” picking a side between Abramowitz and Fiorina.

But Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes ask us to pause. They argue that what’s really driving the wedge isn’t our stances on healthcare or taxes; it’s our feelings about the other party.

The team explores whether polarization comes more from affect (emotion and how much we dislike the other party) rather than ideology (our policy positions).

Spoiler alert: it’s more about emotion than reason.

Methodology

The researchers used a variety of surveys to dig into how Americans feel about opposing political parties. They relied on data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), among others, to track political attitudes from 1960 to 2010.

With thousands of respondents, their sample size is large and robust.

These surveys measured people’s feelings toward their own party and the opposing one, often using “feeling thermometers”  to gauge how warmly or coldly participants felt about each party.

Results and Findings

Here’s where things get interesting (and a bit sad).

The findings show that over time, partisans’ feelings toward their own party have stayed pretty stable. People consistently rate their own party with a warm 70 out of 100.

But the real change? Their feelings toward the other party. The ratings for the opposing party have plummeted — falling by an average of 15 points since the 1980s. And in 2008, the average out-party rating dropped to just above 30.

Here’s the kicker: These negative feelings are based less on actual policy disagreements and more on a sort of tribal instinct.

The mere fact that someone identifies with the “other” side is enough to evoke a strong, negative reaction.

In fact, partisan animosity in the U.S. now exceeds divisions based on race or religion.

That’s right — we’re more divided by politics than by deeply ingrained social identities.

Critiques of the Research

While this study gives us a lot to chew on, it’s worth noting a few limitations.

First, the surveys mostly focus on attitudes in the U.S., so the findings may not be as generalizable to other countries with different political systems.

Additionally, the research was published in 2012 and uses historical data, it’s possible that modern changes in media consumption (like the rise of social media) might have further intensified these trends, something not fully captured in the study.  This is an area for replication and a refresh.

Another area worth exploring? The impact of local vs. national political climates. Does the intensity of local elections, for example, ramp up partisan hatred, or is it more about presidential campaigns and 24/7 news cycles?  Is all politics local or have all politics become nationalized?

Finally, could this be a function of partisans’ already sorting and being asymmetrically aligned on most major issues therefore looking for other reasons to be at each other throats?  While the authors suggest that affective polarization—disliking the opposing party—is not primarily a product of ideological differences on policies.  Instead, it appears to be driven more by social identity dynamics rather than by policy and affect polarization is distinct from policy polarization, a further exploration of causality would be interesting.

Regardless, polarization is likely driven by affect first.  My experience is it is emotion first, not policy.

Conclusion

So, you’re telling me that people get emotionally charged over politics? NO WAY!

Next, you’ll tell me that Tom doesn’t like Jerry, and the sun rises in the east.

But seriously, how does “affective polarization”—that gut-level emotional attachment where we love our party and loathe the other—affect what we believe? It turns out, it’s not just about cheering for your team; it might also mean believing whatever makes your side look good, even if it’s, well, a bit shaky on the facts.

Given the swirl of misinformation around FEMA’s hurricane response lately, I wanted to dig deeper into our previous exploration of affective polarization and explore how affective polarization shapes what people accept as truth.

Let’s explore some additional academic research that digs further into this phenomenon!

Introduction

The study by Libby Jenke focuses on how political party loyalty (affective polarization) influences our belief in misinformation, especially when the misinformation aligns with our own party.

Affective polarization has already been blamed for various social ills—like ruining Thanksgiving dinners—but what about its effects on political beliefs?

This paper argues that those who are highly polarized are more likely to believe misinformation that favors their party and dismiss information that favors the opposition.

Methodology

Results and Findings

Here’s where it gets interesting. The research confirmed that affective polarization indeed makes people more likely to believe misinformation that supports their party’s narrative.

If you’re deeply emotionally invested in your political party, you’re more inclined to believe information—even false information—that makes your side look good. On the flip side, you’re more likely to reject anything that might put your opponents in a positive light, even if it’s true.

This pattern held for both Democrats and Republicans, with one caveat: political sophistication (meaning how much someone knows about politics) doesn’t help. In fact, more politically knowledgeable folks are just better at rationalizing their party’s misinformation.  

“Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it,” (Jenke 2023, p 825)

For example, Republicans were more likely to believe misinformation about illegal voting in the 2016 election and less likely to believe in Russian interference. Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that Trump deported more unauthorized immigrants than Obama—an inaccuracy.

The study found that increased affective polarization was a significant predictor of believing in-party-congruent misinformation and disbelieving out-party-congruent misinformation.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

While the study does a solid job of linking affective polarization to misinformation belief, it doesn’t fully explore why political sophistication exacerbates the problem instead of mitigating it. Shouldn’t smarter people know better?

Another area for future study is how to break the cycle of polarization. The paper suggests that simply educating people more might not be enough—after all, the more politically savvy you are, the better you are at confirming your biases.

Moreover, the study’s focus on U.S. political dynamics raises questions about whether these findings would hold in other countries with different political structures or levels of polarization.

An interesting future study could explore these findings in a multi-party system to see if those citizens experience the same patterns.

Conclusion