A recent discussion about AI and virtual agents led to an intriguing question: Could they be trained to predict public opinion?

There are companies attempting to train agents by census data, voter files, and other assorted data then spinning them up and polling the agents with typical political polling.  It’s wild.  

This, naturally, spiraled into jokes about living in a simulation. But the idea stuck with me, fueling my curiosity about AI’s role in politics.

I then came across this paper that explores whether large language models (LLMs) can simulate senatorial decision-making and, more importantly, whether they can identify conditions that encourage bipartisanship.

Researchers Zachary Baker and Zarif Azher created AI-driven agents representing real U.S. Senators, placing them in a virtual simulation of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The results suggest that under certain conditions, these agents exhibit realistic debate patterns and even compromise across party lines.

Introduction

Political gridlock and polarization defines modern legislative processes, with bipartisan cooperation often seeming elusive.

This study explores whether large language models (LLMs) can simulate senatorial decision-making and, more importantly, whether they can identify conditions that encourage bipartisanship.

Researchers Zachary Baker and Zarif Azher created AI-driven agents representing real U.S. Senators, placing them in a virtual simulation of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The results suggest that under certain conditions, these agents exhibit realistic debate patterns and even compromise across party lines.

Methodology

• U.S. aid to Ukraine.
• A general discussion on necessary legislative actions./li>

Results and Findings

AI Agents Could Engage in Realistic Debate

The agents demonstrated an ability to recall prior discussion points, build arguments, and reflect on their positions. Their reflections aligned with their initial stances, reinforcing the validity of the simulation.

For example:

Agent Rubio: “During the committee meeting, I strongly advocated for substantial military aid to Ukraine… I believe we can’t afford to wait, and our response needs to be swift and decisive.”

Agent Wyden: “I raised concerns about balancing domestic needs with the urgency of supporting Ukraine. While I understand the gravity of the situation, I stressed the importance of accountability.”

Expert Evaluations Showed Moderate to High Believability

The expert reviewers assigned mean believability scores above 5 across all tested scenarios. The funding-for-Ukraine debate received an average score of 7.45, suggesting that the AI agents’ discussions mirrored real-world legislative arguments convincingly.

Bipartisanship Emerged When External Factors Shifted

One of the study’s most intriguing findings was how agents reacted to external perturbations. When the simulation introduced new intelligence indicating an imminent Russian breakthrough in Ukraine, previously hesitant senators became more willing to compromise. This shift suggests that real-world bipartisanship may hinge on clear, immediate external threats.

Critiques and Areas for Further Study

Limited Scope and Sample Size

The study only included six senators from one committee, limiting its generalizability. Future research should expand to larger legislative bodies and different committees to test whether similar bipartisan trends emerge.

Lack of Real-World Verification

While the AI agents’ actions were rated as “believable,” the study did not compare their decisions to real-world legislative outcomes. A follow-up study could test whether historical simulations align with actual votes and policy developments.

Simplified Agent Memory and Interaction

More sophisticated training structures and multi-agent training could enhance realism.

Chat GPT 3.5 Was Used

AI Senators were created with ChatGPT 3.5. Noting the expendential improvement with later models.

Conclusion

For me, this study is less about specific findings and more of a proof of concept—an early glimpse into what AI-driven simulations could mean for legislative analysis and decision-making. The possibilities are vast.

Imagine a public affairs specialist training an AI model on a government official. The technology is nearly there. Could one use Google’s Notebook LM to upload hundreds of sources on a policymaker and their key issues, then query against it? Absolutely. Could one simulate meetings? Likely. Predict outcomes? Maybe not yet, but it’s coming.

What if you trained agents on entire legislative bodies? Florida’s regular legislative session just started this week. Predicting legislative outcomes of floor votes is relatively straightforward—partisanship and leadership preferences dictate much of the process. But the real power isn’t in forecasting final votes; it’s in modeling committee member markups, where deals are made and policies are shaped. Could AI map those interactions? That’s where this research gets interesting.

My head is spinning with what makes the most sense in training data and what other factors to consider.  

As AI agents and models improve, these simulations could become invaluable for political research, policy development, lobbyists, and public affairs officials.

The ability to test legislative scenarios before they unfold could transform how decisions are made and policies are shaped.

In political theory, two dominant models attempt to explain how power and public policy are shaped within a democracy.

The first is pluralism, the idea that a diverse array of interest groups competes within the political arena, with policies emerging as a compromise reflecting the public’s competing demands.

The second is elitism, which argues that a small, concentrated group of individuals or entities—typically those with significant economic or institutional power—dominates decision-making, often to the exclusion of broader societal interests.

But, as they say, “all models are wrong, but some are useful.”

Reality is rarely so clear-cut. Enter elite pluralism, a hybrid model that offers a more nuanced perspective. This theory acknowledges the competitive nature of pluralism but emphasizes that not all interest groups are created equal. While many groups may vie for influence, certain “elite” groups—those with disproportionate access to resources, networks, and institutional power—inevitably hold a stronger hand.

Elite pluralism explains why some voices, despite the principles of democratic competition, resonate more loudly in the halls of power.  It’s not just about having a seat at the table; it’s about owning the table—or at least the most valuable seats around it.  While competition exists it is just not a fair fight among equals.

Well-resourced groups have mastered this interplay between pluralism and elitism, creating systems where competition seemingly exists, but the winners are often predetermined. The audacious tactics they use to shape policy and public opinion are worth exploring.

The Audacious Public Affairs Playbook

A deeper dive into tactics used to shape the political battleground by any means necessary.

Machiavelli is often misquoted or misunderstood as saying, “It is better to be feared than loved.” That’s not exactly what he wrote.

In The Prince, he actually wrote: “Whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse. The answer is, of course, that it would be best to be both loved and feared.”

However, he acknowledged that ideal conditions rarely exist, and when forced to choose, one should resort to being feared. Why? Because people are fickle. Love persists only as long as it aligns with self-interest, but the fear of pain and punishment remains constant.

In the world of public affairs, these principles are alive and well. I’ve generally categorized the tactics in the audacious playbook into two main camps: Buying Your Love or Beating It Out of You.

“Buying Your Love” Public Affairs Tactics

Tactic:  Campaign Contributions & PACs

Financial support for political candidates or causes can buy access, influence, and loyalty. Well-resourced groups often make substantial donations to ensure that their voices are heard in the policy-making process.  This is especially true in the era of super pacs and in the wake of the Citizens United decision.

Example: Elon Musk spends $277 million to back Trump and Republican candidates

Example2: Why some California Democrats take Big Oil money and vote against environmental laws

Tactic: Astroturfing

Creating the illusion of grassroots support to sway public opinion or influence policymakers. By creating a citizens group with little no to citizens “public” support can be seemingly manufactured for a cause, and groups can seem more popular or legitimate than they truly are.

Example:  Microsoft accuses Google of secretly funding regulatory astroturf campaign

Tactic: Lobbying

Direct interaction with lawmakers, regulators, and government officials to push for favorable policies. This often involves offering expertise, research, and sometimes personal incentives to sway decisions.  For example, the pharmaceutical industry spent $293,701,614 in 2024.

Example:  Lobbying Data Summary

Example2:  Lobbying Top Spenders by Sector

Example3:  Lobbying Top Spenders by Industry

Tactic: Think Tanks & Research Funding

Well-resourced groups can fund research from “intellectually” aligned groups or universities, or even establish think tanks to produce research supporting their agenda. These tactics lend credibility and shape public discourse by presenting biased information as fact.

Example:The Secret Donors Behind the Center for American Progress and Other Think Tanks

Example2:  Public Universities Get an Education in Private Industry

Tactic: Partnerships with Charities or Foundations

Donations to charitable organizations or foundations can help create positive public relations, align with a specific cause, and gain goodwill among key stakeholders. This can also be a form of indirect influence and sometimes leads to implicit quid pro quo.

Example:  Strings Attached: How utilities use charitable giving to influence politics and increase investor profits

Tactic: Revolving Door Employment

Hiring former government officials to serve in advisory roles or as lobbyists. This builds connections and ensures that former decision-makers continue to champion the interests of the group they once regulated.

Example: Video: Jack Abramoff: The lobbyist’s playbook on 60min 

Tactic: Cultural Influence

Sponsorships and partnerships with media outlets, celebrities, and influencers can shape public opinion and create a favorable cultural narrative around the group’s goals.

 Example:  Influencers are playing a big role in this year’s election. There’s no way to tell who’s getting paid for their endorsements

Tactic: Political Endorsements and Strategic Alliances

Aligning with influential political figures or organizations can boost credibility and secure powerful allies in decision-making.

Example:  LeBron James Shares Strong Political Message On New Nike Sneakers

Example2:  Harris Grabs Green New Deal Network Endorsement That Eluded Biden  

Example 3: Fossil fuel firms ‘spent £4bn on sportswashing’ says report

Tactic: Event Sponsorships

Hosting or sponsoring high-profile events (e.g., policy conferences, galas) to gain access to influential stakeholders and enhance visibility.

Example: The Davos Forum and its role in networking

Tactic: Educational Initiatives or Scholarships

Funding educational programs or scholarships that align with policy goals to build goodwill and influence future thought leaders.

Example: Koch Foundation Criticized Again For Influencing Florida State

“Beating it Out of You” Public Affairs Tactics

A quick note on the use of the “dark arts” in public affairs: Sponsoring groups rarely engage in these tactics directly (especially if they are a public company). Instead, they often employ a layered strategy.

The key is to establish plausible deniability by structuring operations through cutouts often consultants and/or trade associations. By creating multiple layers, those funding the efforts (often to the tune of millions of dollars) can testify under oath that while their money may have been used to advance their interests, they had “no knowledge” of the specific tactics or details. They can then claim with a straight face, “Yes, we spent millions.  We also always follow the law at XYZ group, have a dedicated compliance department, and firmly believe in our right to participate in the political process.  We control no 501c(4) nor do we have a record of ever funding said group.  XYZ has broken no laws.”

“So far as he is able, a prince should stick to the path of good but, if the necessity arises, he should know how to follow evil.”  ― Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince

Tactic: Opposition Research

In-depth digging into the backgrounds, records, and personal lives of political opponents or critics. This can be used to discredit individuals, create scandal, or shift public opinion against adversaries.

Example: Definers tries to reboot after Facebook oppo research controversy

Tactic: Corporate Espionage

In some cases, organizations may resort to stealing trade secrets, confidential information, or engaging in sabotage to gain a competitive or political edge.

Example:  Linwei Ding was a Google software engineer. He was also a prolific thief of trade secrets, say prosecutors.

Tactic: Smear Campaigns

Negative campaigning or information warfare designed to destroy reputations, spread misinformation, or stoke fear. This can be targeted at individuals, organizations, or entire movements that oppose the group’s interests.

Example: Facebook resorts to old smear tactics against TikTok
Example2: Facebook exposed in Google smear campaign

Tactic: Threats of Retaliation

Using threats, whether economic (such as pulling investments) or political (such as targeting re-election campaigns), to punish or coerce opponents into submission.  The old “you’ll never work in this town again” threat.

Example:  Trump has made more than 100 threats to prosecute or punish perceived enemies

Tactic: Legal Pressure and Litigation

Filing lawsuits or using the legal system to intimidate or financially drain opponents. Well-resourced groups may use legal battles as a form of harassment, knowing that smaller groups lack the resources to fight back.

Example: Frivolous suits stalk journalists in states without anti-SLAPP laws

Example2: Appeals court upholds Rick Wilson win over Michael Flynn in defamation case 

Tactic: Astroturfing as a Coercive Tool

While also used to manufacture support, astroturfing can be deployed in a more aggressive form to attack and drown out opposition voices, overwhelming public discourse with misleading or false narratives.

Example: Mad at MADD

Tactic: Media Manipulation

Using media to create fear, confusion, or resentment toward certain groups, issues, or individuals. This can include planting stories, leaking confidential information, or directly influencing journalists to push a particular narrative.

We are now in the phase with media becoming so fractured that certain organizations are attempting to purchase media outlets outright or fund them via advertising / sponsorships as to co-opt any ‘journalistic’ standards.  

Example: Powerbrokers: How FPL secretly took over a Florida news site and used it to bash critics

Example:  In the Southeast, power company money flows to news sites that attack their critics

Tactic: Monetary and Economic Leverage

Threatening to withdraw funding or financial support from entities that don’t align with the group’s interests. This tactic uses economic influence as a means of forcing compliance or silence.

Example:  Harvard and UPenn donor revolt raises concerns about big money on campuses

Tactic: Political Bullying and Intimidation

Using the power of government or other institutional levers to punish or pressure opponents. This can involve public shaming, threats of regulatory crackdowns, or direct threats of political retaliation.

Example:  Twitter accused of bullying anti-hate campaigners

Tactic: Straight Up Bribery

The direct exchange of money, gifts, or favors to secure a specific action or decision from a government official, policymaker, or other influential figure.  R real quid pro quo.  While illegal in most democracies, bribery remains a clandestine tool used to bypass traditional lobbying and advocacy efforts when outcomes are deemed critical or urgent by well-resourced entities. (and now thanks to SCOTUS, it appears you can have a winky winky agreement and then tip after.)

Example: Indian billionaire Gautam Adani’s business empire at risk amid U.S. indictment for fraud, bribery

Example2: Supreme Court sides with mayor accused of accepting a bribe in latest ruling to limit public anti-corruption laws

Conclusion: Understanding the Audacious Public Affairs Playbook

This audacious public affairs playbook is neither exhaustive nor prescriptive. It highlights the lengths to which well-resourced groups can and will go to influence policy, perception, and power. Some tactics operate within the bounds of the law, others test its limits in legal gray areas, and a few are outright illegal. Many fall into ethical gray zones, while others blatantly cross ethical lines.

In an ideal democracy, every voice would be heard equally. Yet, as elite pluralism demonstrates, the reality is far more complex. Influence, access, and resources skew the playing field, often leaving ordinary citizens to compete against entities with disproportionate power.

Whether you admire or detest the tactics in this playbook, they reveal the raw, realpolitik side of public affairs.

However, don’t become too cynical. History is full of examples where less-resourced efforts have defied the odds to harness public opinion and achieve policy or political victories. Often, these successes come in reaction to a well-resourced group overplaying its hand or through decisive legal action.

While power and resources undeniably play significant roles in public affairs, they are not invincible.  Just as the casino doesn’t win every time…..luck and timing can lead to a winning hand.  However, continuing the casino metaphor, over time, the odds remain stacked in favor of the well-resourced. And like in a casino, the house usually wins.

As you reflect on these methods, ask yourself: Where do you draw the line between strategy and manipulation? Between fair competition and coercion? Public affairs, like democracy itself, demands constant vigilance, active participation, and critical scrutiny to ensure it serves the public good.

What’s your take? Are these tactics necessary evils, or do they erode trust in our institutions?  Most importantly, what was left out?

PS.  We must pay homage to two of the biggest contributors to the playbook.

The original OG:  The Tobacco Industry

Then the Energy Industry took tobacco’s playbook and improved upon it.

Rarely do I read an academic study that terrifies me.  Well…unfortunately my colleague sent me a study that sent chills down my spine.  The future is here, and we aren’t likely to be prepared for it.

As we have written before, persuasion is hard. If you’ve ever tried to convince a friend on any political issue or even to watch your favorite show (and failed), you know how tough it can be. Now imagine a chatbot trying to do it! Crazy, right? Well, not so much.

Recent research shows artificial intelligence (AI) might be better at persuasion than you think. Let’s dive into the science behind this surprising finding.

Introduction

This study explores whether AI, specifically GPT-3, can influence human opinions on political issues. The research tackles a simple yet profound question: Can AI persuade as effectively as humans? Spoiler alert: The answer is yes—and it’s got people talking about the implications for politics and beyond.

Conclusion

This study marks a step in understanding AI’s role in persuasion. As AI tools continue to advance, their capacity to shape opinions could significantly influence politics, advertising, and even our interpersonal communication.

While the observed effects may seem modest, the effects are small with humans.  The real power of AI lies in its scalability. When combined with automation, this technology poses a potential threat, particularly in the hands of malicious actors. The ability to produce persuasive messages at scale could amplify foreign interference in elections or facilitate widespread misinformation campaigns.

Although I hesitate to advocate for additional regulations, the immense power of these tools demands responsibility.  It is why the authors write, “Our findings call for immediate consideration of regulations of the use of AI in political activities.” 

Moreover, we cannot overlook the role of platforms like TikTok.  Our youth are unknowingly contributing to the development of AI technologies that could potentially be leveraged against us.

I agree, policymakers must remain vigilant, as the risks of unregulated use could undermine public trust.  

Reflecting on these implications, I suddenly feel a bit like a Luddite.   UGH!

Research shows that when local newspapers fade away:

• Local Political Awareness Erodes: Citizens know less about local issues and are less likely to participate in state and local politics.
• Nationalization of Politics Intensifies: All politics becomes national politics.
• Democratic Accountability Weakens: Local corruption thrives when no one is watching.
• Civic Engagement Declines: Voter turnout decreases, especially in smaller communities.

Now, new findings tie the death of local newspapers to something even more worrisome: increased polarization and an increase in straight-ticket voting.

Let’s dive into the academic research that unpacks these intriguing connections.

Paper Introduction

The researchers sought to answer a pressing question: what happens to voting behavior when local newspapers shut down?

Specifically, they examined the effect of these closures on split-ticket voting—where voters pick candidates from different parties for different offices.

The hypothesis? Fewer newspapers might mean less local political news, leading voters to rely on national, partisan sources instead. Spoiler alert: the hypothesis holds water.

Methodology

This study employed a quasi-experimental design using genetic matching.

It compared counties with and without newspaper closures between 2009 and 2012 while controlling for demographic and economic factors.

The researchers analyzed 110 closures and measured changes in split-ticket voting by looking at differences in votes for presidential and senatorial candidates in 2012. Their main dataset came from the National Digital Newspaper Program and other demographic sources.

Results and Findings

1. 1. • A 1.9% Drop in Split-Ticket Voting Counties that lost a local newspaper saw a decline in split-ticket voting, meaning voters were more likely to align their choices strictly with party lines. While the percentage may seem small, this represents a meaningful uptick in polarization.
      • The Role of National News Voters in affected counties appeared to turn to national media, which is brimming with partisan rhetoric. Without local reporting to highlight nuanced, community-specific political issues, voters defaulted to “us versus them” party cues.
      • It’s Not About Information Loss The researchers ruled out the idea that voters simply lacked enough political information. Instead, they suggested that nationalized media drowned out diverse perspectives, emphasizing polarized party identities.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

1. Is 1.9% really that large? This study look at changes for national offices.  At the local level (congressional & state legislatures), it is likely that a voter lives in a safe district, and 1.9% isn’t likely to make a huge difference.
2. Generality of Results:
   The study used counties as its unit of analysis, which may mask individual-level differences in behavior. Future research could incorporate voter surveys for a more granular view.
3. Limited Time Frame:
   The analysis stops at 2012 (darn peer review….), and it’s unclear whether the trends persisted or grew stronger in subsequent years as media consolidation continued.  The
4. Geographic:
   Regions with robust alternative media sources might experience less polarization than those with few news outlets.  Exploring the rural/urban divide specifically and expanding the dataset to include these factors could yield deeper insights.

Conclusion

Local newspapers are more than just sources for restaurant health reports, high school football scores, and lottery numbers.

They serve as a vital check against potential corruption and the increasing influence of nationalized, hyper-partisan news outlets.

This study presents a clear message:  local journalism is about more than mere nostalgia – it’s about mitigating the growing political divide in America.

Sadly, I believe the decline of local newspapers is now irreversible.

Despite recognizing the effects, I confess I cancelled my own subscription to the local newspaper.  The “local” newspaper had lost its local focus, and honestly, the overall product is terrible. (To add insult to injury, the cancellation process was appalling. After paying online, I was forced to speak with a persistent salesperson who tried to pressure me with “special deals” “just for me.”)

Nevertheless, it’s essential that we grasp the significant consequences of this trend.

Introduction to Polarization

I’ve written about polarization many times over the past year. It’s one of the most significant factors in U.S. politics today, if not the most. Typically, I focus on one individual study or paper, but today I want to zoom out and examine the findings in a broader context.

Neo-Beginnings

Every graduate student in political science since the early 2010s has likely written a paper reconciling the academic “disagreement” between Morris Fiorina and Alan Abramowitz.

As far as academic “disagreements” go this one was…combative and sharp.   It was / is a doozy.

The argument in a nutshell:

• • Fiorina argues that polarization is primarily an elite-driven phenomenon, with political elites (politicians, activists, media) becoming more polarized while the mass public remains relatively moderate. For the general public, he suggests that there is more sorting than true ideological polarization—voters align their party identification with their preferences, but they are not deeply divided on most policy issues. (Fiorina et al, 2011)
• • Abramowitz, on the other hand, emphasizes that polarization is widespread among the electorate, especially among the most engaged citizens, who have become more ideologically consistent and politically divided. He argues that as the electorate becomes more polarized, affective polarization (i.e., the emotional dislike of opposing partisans) increases. (Abramowitz, 2017)

For me, it was strange argument because their views are compatible with each other, when you ask the question, “Under what circumstances can both of these positions be correct?”  (Especially when we have the ability to consider additional research?)

Among political elites, Abramowitz is right—polarization is high, emotional, and often extreme. Among non-elites, Fiorina’s position holds more weight, but research suggests he may be looking in the wrong place.

Most of the general public doesn’t deeply care about politics. This is estimated by some to be 20-30% of the people (Kalmoe, 2020).  I have seen some that estimate it as low as 15% (Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD., n.d.).

However, when polled about policy, many give moderate responses—what they often mean is, “I don’t know, and I don’t care.” This middle-of-the-road answer satisfies the pollster but doesn’t represent how they’ll vote.

Instead, their behavior is guided by cues from political leaders or social circles. These cues encourage distrust and dislike of the opposing party, making voter behavior appear polarized even when personal ideology isn’t.

Said another way, it is really difficult for any pollster to capture an answer posed about the funding mechanisms of charter schools when the answer is likely closer to:

“meh, I don’t really care about this issue and/or I am not knowledgeable about the issue.  I’ll answer your question with a middle of the road answer because you asked politely – but know I will very likely govern my political behavior by cues received from my political party – especially political leaders – and/or my social circle that I value which are now highly correlated.  And both of those are likely to tell me not to like the “other” party and that is basic human nature anyway, so my political behavior and voting will appear polarized too.” – voter

To add some final nuance: Abramowitz’s view dominates in low-turnout elections, like primaries, where highly engaged voters participate in mostly non-competitive districts. (and well since political elites and political nerds tend to hang out together… their perception is of extreme polarization…leading to more affect polarization…leading the public…)

But I digress, Fiorina’s perspective becomes more relevant in general elections, where turnout is higher and broader.

Drivers of Polarization

Let’s shift gears to what drives polarization. Looking at U.S. trends since the 1960s, the literature points to several familiar themes:

• • Economic inequality: The growing gap between rich and poor (McCarty et al., 2007; Zacher, 2024).
  • Racial issues: A key driver in the U.S. (McAdam, 2015).
  • Partisan realignment: Spurred by economic inequality and civil rights movements (Highton, 2020; Kuziemko & Washington, 2018).
  • Media fragmentation: The rise of ideologically selective media (Prior, 2005; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).
  • Geographic sorting: Americans increasingly live near like-minded neighbors (Cho et al., 2013).
  • Uncompetitive districts: Less competition leads to more extreme partisanship (Stonecash et al., 2018).

Human Nature and Affect

While these structural factors matter, in my take of the subject if I zoom out: basic human nature and human psychology are the real driving forces.

Most polarization today isn’t driven by ideology but by emotion and affect—a gut-level dislike of “others” (Young & de-Wit, 2024). Party and geographic sorting (Cho et al., 2013) make it easier to identify “them” as “others”, and human nature does the rest. We’re hardwired to distrust outsiders.

This is where Fiorina was looking in the wrong place for polarization.  For many, politics is not not a well thought set of political ideology or issue stances (Kalmoe, 2020).

Rather for many, politics is driven by a gut reaction and the details are outsourced to elites (Lenz, 2013), who are happy to exploit these emotional divides for power and re-election (Karol, 2015).

Impacts on Governing

The consequences of affective polarization are severe:

1. Growing contempt: Americans increasingly distrust “others” (Geiger, 2014).
2. Exaggerated perceptions: We overestimate how extreme our opponents’ positions really are (Lees & Cikara, 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2021).
3. Declining cooperation: Dislike makes compromise nearly impossible (Geiger, 2014b).
4. Government dysfunction: Legislative gridlock is the norm (Binder, 2004).
5. Eroding trust: Polarization harms trust in government (American Academy, 2023), media (Shearer, 2024), and even each other (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2017; Lee, 2022).
6. Risk of violence: At its extreme , polarization creates “an environment in which political violence is more socially acceptable and frequent”  (Piazza, 2023).

What’s Next?

Can anything be done about polarization?  Can we stop this polarization?  Is the current polariation any worse than the polarization seen pre-1960?  All questions for another blog post.

I’ve briefly touched on this topic before in What is the Solution to Extreme Divisiveness? You can check it out here. Spoiler: one solution might involve sharing scotch with someone you disagree with.

But what’s next topic deserves another deep dive. Stay tuned.

Previous Blog Posts on Polarization

• • Does Policy really matter in political campaigns?
  • Vibe Check: Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology
  • Do Americans Really Care About ‘Democracy’?
  • Hyper-partisanship & Hyper-polarization : America’s Pending Divorce 
  • Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief 
  • Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger? Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition
  • What is the solution to extreme divisiveness? 

References

Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American democracy. Yale University Press.

Binder, S. A. (2004). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Brookings Institution.

Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2013). Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(4), 856–870.

Highton, B. (2020). The cultural realignment of state white electorates in the 21st century. Political Behavior, 42(4), 1319–1341. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09590-5

Distrust, political polarization, and America’s challenged institutions. (2023, May 17). American Academy of Arts & Sciences; Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/news/distrust-political-polarization-and-americas-challenged-institutions

Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2011). Culture war? The myth of a polarized America (3rd ed.). Pearson.

Geiger, A. (2014, June 12). Political polarization in the American public. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public

Geiger, A. (2014b, June 12). Section 4: Political compromise and divisive policy debates. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisive-policy-debates/

Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2017). Political trust and polarization. In E. M. Uslaner (Ed.), Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.15

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. The Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x

Kalmoe, N. P. (2020). Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 41(4), 771–794.

Karol, D. (2015). Party activists, interest groups, and polarization in American politics. In American Gridlock (pp. 68–85). Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, I., & Washington, E. (2018). Why did the Democrats lose the South? Bringing new data to an old debate. American Economic Review, 108(10), 2830–2867. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161413

Lee, A. H.-Y. (2022). Social trust in polarized times: How perceptions of political polarization affect Americans’ trust in each other. Political Behavior, 44(3), 1533–1554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09787-1

Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2020). Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(3), 279–286. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

Lenz, G. S. (2013). Follow the leader?: How voters respond to politicians’ policies and performance. University of Chicago Press.

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Introduction

Political incivility—rude and disrespectful rhetoric—has become a hallmark of populist campaigns.

This study by Vargiu and colleagues investigates whether (and under what conditions) such tactics are effective in persuasion or influence and whether personality traits or populist attitudes make people more receptive to this behavior.

Current Understanding of Research (Before This Study)

Prior to this research, incivility in political communication was widely assumed to reduce a message’s effectiveness. Studies have shown that:

• • • Negative Reactions to Incivility: People tend to view uncivil rhetoric as unprofessional and damaging to a candidate’s credibility.
    • Limited Persuasion: Civility is often believed to enhance a message’s appeal, making audiences more likely to engage with the content.
    • Partisan Bias: Some evidence suggests people are more forgiving of incivility when it comes from their own political group, although this finding has been inconsistent.

This new study seeks to clarify whether these assumptions hold true across different cultures and personality types.

Methodology

The researchers conducted two experimental studies:

1. 1. 1. Switzerland Study: 1,340 participants.
      2. United States Study: 1,820 participants.

Design: A 2×2 factorial experiment exposed participants to persuasive messages about controversial topics (e.g., gender-related policies). Messages were framed as either:

• • • Civil or Uncivil: Respectful versus disrespectful language.
    • Congruent or Incongruent: Aligning with or opposing participants’ initial beliefs.

Independent Variable: Civility of the message.
Dependent Variable: Change in opinion, measured on a scale from -10 (maximum backfire) to +10 (full persuasion).
Moderators: Populist attitudes and personality traits, including psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism.

Participants’ opinions were measured before and after exposure to determine how persuasive each message was.

Results and Findings

General Impact of Incivility

• • • Incivility Doesn’t Always Backfire: Across both countries, uncivil and civil messages were equally persuasive on average. This challenges the assumption that incivility universally harms credibility.
    • Message Congruence Matters: In Switzerland, uncivil messages aligned with participants’ beliefs were slightly less persuasive than civil ones. However, incongruent messages (those challenging beliefs) were more persuasive, regardless of civility.

Cultural Differences

• • • In the U.S., populist attitudes significantly increased the persuasiveness of uncivil messages, especially those that were incongruent with prior beliefs.
    • In Switzerland, where political discourse is more consensus-driven, uncivil messages were less influential overall.

Role of Personality Traits

• • • Populist Attitudes: U.S. participants with stronger populist leanings were more likely to find uncivil messages persuasive.
    • Dark Traits: People with higher levels of psychopathy and Machiavellianism responded more positively to uncivil messages, particularly when the messages contradicted their initial views.

Critiques of the Research or Additional Areas of Study

While groundbreaking, the study has some limitations:

1. Cultural Specificity: Results varied between Switzerland and the U.S., limiting generalizability to other countries or political systems.
2. Definition of Incivility: The study operationalized incivility as explicit disrespect or vulgarity, which may not capture subtler forms like sarcasm or passive aggression.
3. Medium of Communication: The research used text-based platforms like forums and tweets, which may not reflect how incivility operates in live debates or multimedia formats.  Step away from the keyboard and say it to my face!

Future research could explore:

• Broader definitions of incivility and their impact.
• Different communication channels (e.g., televised debates, social media videos).
• How incivility interacts with audience demographics beyond personality traits.
• How incivility interacts with source credibility.  

Conclusion

As my momma always said: “Jerks of a feather always flock together!”.  Okay, she has never said this, but she did warn me to take care of who I surround myself with.

Incivility isn’t universally persuasive, but it resonates with certain audiences, particularly individuals with populist attitudes or darker personality traits.

This suggests that while uncivil rhetoric can be a risky strategy, it may yield rewards in specific cultural and psychological contexts.

For political strategists, this research highlights the importance of tailoring communication styles to the audience.

For the rest of us, it raises an uncomfortable question: Are we more influenced by insults than we’d like to admit?

Clearly, the answer for some is “damn right, jerkface!”