Research shows that when local newspapers fade away:

• Local Political Awareness Erodes: Citizens know less about local issues and are less likely to participate in state and local politics.
• Nationalization of Politics Intensifies: All politics becomes national politics.
• Democratic Accountability Weakens: Local corruption thrives when no one is watching.
• Civic Engagement Declines: Voter turnout decreases, especially in smaller communities.

Now, new findings tie the death of local newspapers to something even more worrisome: increased polarization and an increase in straight-ticket voting.

Let’s dive into the academic research that unpacks these intriguing connections.

Paper Introduction

The researchers sought to answer a pressing question: what happens to voting behavior when local newspapers shut down?

Specifically, they examined the effect of these closures on split-ticket voting—where voters pick candidates from different parties for different offices.

The hypothesis? Fewer newspapers might mean less local political news, leading voters to rely on national, partisan sources instead. Spoiler alert: the hypothesis holds water.

Methodology

This study employed a quasi-experimental design using genetic matching.

It compared counties with and without newspaper closures between 2009 and 2012 while controlling for demographic and economic factors.

The researchers analyzed 110 closures and measured changes in split-ticket voting by looking at differences in votes for presidential and senatorial candidates in 2012. Their main dataset came from the National Digital Newspaper Program and other demographic sources.

Results and Findings

1. 1. • A 1.9% Drop in Split-Ticket Voting Counties that lost a local newspaper saw a decline in split-ticket voting, meaning voters were more likely to align their choices strictly with party lines. While the percentage may seem small, this represents a meaningful uptick in polarization.
      • The Role of National News Voters in affected counties appeared to turn to national media, which is brimming with partisan rhetoric. Without local reporting to highlight nuanced, community-specific political issues, voters defaulted to “us versus them” party cues.
      • It’s Not About Information Loss The researchers ruled out the idea that voters simply lacked enough political information. Instead, they suggested that nationalized media drowned out diverse perspectives, emphasizing polarized party identities.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

1. Is 1.9% really that large? This study look at changes for national offices.  At the local level (congressional & state legislatures), it is likely that a voter lives in a safe district, and 1.9% isn’t likely to make a huge difference.
2. Generality of Results:
   The study used counties as its unit of analysis, which may mask individual-level differences in behavior. Future research could incorporate voter surveys for a more granular view.
3. Limited Time Frame:
   The analysis stops at 2012 (darn peer review….), and it’s unclear whether the trends persisted or grew stronger in subsequent years as media consolidation continued.  The
4. Geographic:
   Regions with robust alternative media sources might experience less polarization than those with few news outlets.  Exploring the rural/urban divide specifically and expanding the dataset to include these factors could yield deeper insights.

Conclusion

Local newspapers are more than just sources for restaurant health reports, high school football scores, and lottery numbers.

They serve as a vital check against potential corruption and the increasing influence of nationalized, hyper-partisan news outlets.

This study presents a clear message:  local journalism is about more than mere nostalgia – it’s about mitigating the growing political divide in America.

Sadly, I believe the decline of local newspapers is now irreversible.

Despite recognizing the effects, I confess I cancelled my own subscription to the local newspaper.  The “local” newspaper had lost its local focus, and honestly, the overall product is terrible. (To add insult to injury, the cancellation process was appalling. After paying online, I was forced to speak with a persistent salesperson who tried to pressure me with “special deals” “just for me.”)

Nevertheless, it’s essential that we grasp the significant consequences of this trend.

Introduction to Polarization

I’ve written about polarization many times over the past year. It’s one of the most significant factors in U.S. politics today, if not the most. Typically, I focus on one individual study or paper, but today I want to zoom out and examine the findings in a broader context.

Neo-Beginnings

Every graduate student in political science since the early 2010s has likely written a paper reconciling the academic “disagreement” between Morris Fiorina and Alan Abramowitz.

As far as academic “disagreements” go this one was…combative and sharp.   It was / is a doozy.

The argument in a nutshell:

• • Fiorina argues that polarization is primarily an elite-driven phenomenon, with political elites (politicians, activists, media) becoming more polarized while the mass public remains relatively moderate. For the general public, he suggests that there is more sorting than true ideological polarization—voters align their party identification with their preferences, but they are not deeply divided on most policy issues. (Fiorina et al, 2011)
• • Abramowitz, on the other hand, emphasizes that polarization is widespread among the electorate, especially among the most engaged citizens, who have become more ideologically consistent and politically divided. He argues that as the electorate becomes more polarized, affective polarization (i.e., the emotional dislike of opposing partisans) increases. (Abramowitz, 2017)

For me, it was strange argument because their views are compatible with each other, when you ask the question, “Under what circumstances can both of these positions be correct?”  (Especially when we have the ability to consider additional research?)

Among political elites, Abramowitz is right—polarization is high, emotional, and often extreme. Among non-elites, Fiorina’s position holds more weight, but research suggests he may be looking in the wrong place.

Most of the general public doesn’t deeply care about politics. This is estimated by some to be 20-30% of the people (Kalmoe, 2020).  I have seen some that estimate it as low as 15% (Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD., n.d.).

However, when polled about policy, many give moderate responses—what they often mean is, “I don’t know, and I don’t care.” This middle-of-the-road answer satisfies the pollster but doesn’t represent how they’ll vote.

Instead, their behavior is guided by cues from political leaders or social circles. These cues encourage distrust and dislike of the opposing party, making voter behavior appear polarized even when personal ideology isn’t.

Said another way, it is really difficult for any pollster to capture an answer posed about the funding mechanisms of charter schools when the answer is likely closer to:

“meh, I don’t really care about this issue and/or I am not knowledgeable about the issue.  I’ll answer your question with a middle of the road answer because you asked politely – but know I will very likely govern my political behavior by cues received from my political party – especially political leaders – and/or my social circle that I value which are now highly correlated.  And both of those are likely to tell me not to like the “other” party and that is basic human nature anyway, so my political behavior and voting will appear polarized too.” – voter

To add some final nuance: Abramowitz’s view dominates in low-turnout elections, like primaries, where highly engaged voters participate in mostly non-competitive districts. (and well since political elites and political nerds tend to hang out together… their perception is of extreme polarization…leading to more affect polarization…leading the public…)

But I digress, Fiorina’s perspective becomes more relevant in general elections, where turnout is higher and broader.

Drivers of Polarization

Let’s shift gears to what drives polarization. Looking at U.S. trends since the 1960s, the literature points to several familiar themes:

• • Economic inequality: The growing gap between rich and poor (McCarty et al., 2007; Zacher, 2024).
  • Racial issues: A key driver in the U.S. (McAdam, 2015).
  • Partisan realignment: Spurred by economic inequality and civil rights movements (Highton, 2020; Kuziemko & Washington, 2018).
  • Media fragmentation: The rise of ideologically selective media (Prior, 2005; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).
  • Geographic sorting: Americans increasingly live near like-minded neighbors (Cho et al., 2013).
  • Uncompetitive districts: Less competition leads to more extreme partisanship (Stonecash et al., 2018).

Human Nature and Affect

While these structural factors matter, in my take of the subject if I zoom out: basic human nature and human psychology are the real driving forces.

Most polarization today isn’t driven by ideology but by emotion and affect—a gut-level dislike of “others” (Young & de-Wit, 2024). Party and geographic sorting (Cho et al., 2013) make it easier to identify “them” as “others”, and human nature does the rest. We’re hardwired to distrust outsiders.

This is where Fiorina was looking in the wrong place for polarization.  For many, politics is not not a well thought set of political ideology or issue stances (Kalmoe, 2020).

Rather for many, politics is driven by a gut reaction and the details are outsourced to elites (Lenz, 2013), who are happy to exploit these emotional divides for power and re-election (Karol, 2015).

Impacts on Governing

The consequences of affective polarization are severe:

1. Growing contempt: Americans increasingly distrust “others” (Geiger, 2014).
2. Exaggerated perceptions: We overestimate how extreme our opponents’ positions really are (Lees & Cikara, 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2021).
3. Declining cooperation: Dislike makes compromise nearly impossible (Geiger, 2014b).
4. Government dysfunction: Legislative gridlock is the norm (Binder, 2004).
5. Eroding trust: Polarization harms trust in government (American Academy, 2023), media (Shearer, 2024), and even each other (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2017; Lee, 2022).
6. Risk of violence: At its extreme , polarization creates “an environment in which political violence is more socially acceptable and frequent”  (Piazza, 2023).

What’s Next?

Can anything be done about polarization?  Can we stop this polarization?  Is the current polariation any worse than the polarization seen pre-1960?  All questions for another blog post.

I’ve briefly touched on this topic before in What is the Solution to Extreme Divisiveness? You can check it out here. Spoiler: one solution might involve sharing scotch with someone you disagree with.

But what’s next topic deserves another deep dive. Stay tuned.

Previous Blog Posts on Polarization

• • Does Policy really matter in political campaigns?
  • Vibe Check: Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology
  • Do Americans Really Care About ‘Democracy’?
  • Hyper-partisanship & Hyper-polarization : America’s Pending Divorce 
  • Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief 
  • Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger? Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition
  • What is the solution to extreme divisiveness? 

References

Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American democracy. Yale University Press.

Binder, S. A. (2004). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Brookings Institution.

Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2013). Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(4), 856–870.

Highton, B. (2020). The cultural realignment of state white electorates in the 21st century. Political Behavior, 42(4), 1319–1341. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09590-5

Distrust, political polarization, and America’s challenged institutions. (2023, May 17). American Academy of Arts & Sciences; Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/news/distrust-political-polarization-and-americas-challenged-institutions

Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2011). Culture war? The myth of a polarized America (3rd ed.). Pearson.

Geiger, A. (2014, June 12). Political polarization in the American public. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public

Geiger, A. (2014b, June 12). Section 4: Political compromise and divisive policy debates. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisive-policy-debates/

Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2017). Political trust and polarization. In E. M. Uslaner (Ed.), Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.15

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. The Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x

Kalmoe, N. P. (2020). Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 41(4), 771–794.

Karol, D. (2015). Party activists, interest groups, and polarization in American politics. In American Gridlock (pp. 68–85). Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, I., & Washington, E. (2018). Why did the Democrats lose the South? Bringing new data to an old debate. American Economic Review, 108(10), 2830–2867. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161413

Lee, A. H.-Y. (2022). Social trust in polarized times: How perceptions of political polarization affect Americans’ trust in each other. Political Behavior, 44(3), 1533–1554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09787-1

Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2020). Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(3), 279–286. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

Lenz, G. S. (2013). Follow the leader?: How voters respond to politicians’ policies and performance. University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. (2015). Be careful what you wish for: The ironic connection between the Civil Rights struggle and today’s divided America. Sociological Forum (Randolph, N.J.), 30(S1), 485–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12173

Piazza, J. A. (2023). Political polarization and political violence. Security Studies, 32(3), 476–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780

Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches. (2007). In Choice Reviews Online (Vol. 44, Issue 06, pp. 44-3551-44–3551). American Library Association. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-3551

Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x

Ruggeri, K., Većkalov, B., Bojanić, L., Andersen, T. L., Ashcroft-Jones, S., Ayacaxli, N., Barea-Arroyo, P., Berge, M. L., Bjørndal, L. D., Bursalıoğlu, A., Bühler, V., Čadek, M., Çetinçelik, M., Clay, G., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Damnjanović, K., Dugue, T. M., Esberg, M., Esteban-Serna, C., … Folke, T. (2021). The general fault in our fault lines. Nature Human Behaviour, 5(10), 1369–1380. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01092-x

Shearer, E. (2024, October 10). Americans’ views of 2024 election news. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/

Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD. (n.d.). Apa.org. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.apa.org/news/podcasts/speaking-of-psychology/political-divide

Stonecash, J. M., Brewer, M. D., & Mariani, M. D. (2018). Diverging parties: Social change, realignment, and party polarization. Routledge.

Young, D. J., & de-Wit, L. H. (2024). Affective polarization within parties. Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973

Zacher, S. (2024). Polarization of the rich: The new Democratic allegiance of affluent Americans and the politics of redistribution. Perspectives on Politics, 22(2), 338–356. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722003310

Introduction

Political incivility—rude and disrespectful rhetoric—has become a hallmark of populist campaigns.

This study by Vargiu and colleagues investigates whether (and under what conditions) such tactics are effective in persuasion or influence and whether personality traits or populist attitudes make people more receptive to this behavior.

Current Understanding of Research (Before This Study)

Prior to this research, incivility in political communication was widely assumed to reduce a message’s effectiveness. Studies have shown that:

• • • Negative Reactions to Incivility: People tend to view uncivil rhetoric as unprofessional and damaging to a candidate’s credibility.
    • Limited Persuasion: Civility is often believed to enhance a message’s appeal, making audiences more likely to engage with the content.
    • Partisan Bias: Some evidence suggests people are more forgiving of incivility when it comes from their own political group, although this finding has been inconsistent.

This new study seeks to clarify whether these assumptions hold true across different cultures and personality types.

Methodology

The researchers conducted two experimental studies:

1. 1. 1. Switzerland Study: 1,340 participants.
      2. United States Study: 1,820 participants.

Design: A 2×2 factorial experiment exposed participants to persuasive messages about controversial topics (e.g., gender-related policies). Messages were framed as either:

• • • Civil or Uncivil: Respectful versus disrespectful language.
    • Congruent or Incongruent: Aligning with or opposing participants’ initial beliefs.

Independent Variable: Civility of the message.
Dependent Variable: Change in opinion, measured on a scale from -10 (maximum backfire) to +10 (full persuasion).
Moderators: Populist attitudes and personality traits, including psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism.

Participants’ opinions were measured before and after exposure to determine how persuasive each message was.

Results and Findings

General Impact of Incivility

• • • Incivility Doesn’t Always Backfire: Across both countries, uncivil and civil messages were equally persuasive on average. This challenges the assumption that incivility universally harms credibility.
    • Message Congruence Matters: In Switzerland, uncivil messages aligned with participants’ beliefs were slightly less persuasive than civil ones. However, incongruent messages (those challenging beliefs) were more persuasive, regardless of civility.

Cultural Differences

• • • In the U.S., populist attitudes significantly increased the persuasiveness of uncivil messages, especially those that were incongruent with prior beliefs.
    • In Switzerland, where political discourse is more consensus-driven, uncivil messages were less influential overall.

Role of Personality Traits

• • • Populist Attitudes: U.S. participants with stronger populist leanings were more likely to find uncivil messages persuasive.
    • Dark Traits: People with higher levels of psychopathy and Machiavellianism responded more positively to uncivil messages, particularly when the messages contradicted their initial views.

Critiques of the Research or Additional Areas of Study

While groundbreaking, the study has some limitations:

1. Cultural Specificity: Results varied between Switzerland and the U.S., limiting generalizability to other countries or political systems.
2. Definition of Incivility: The study operationalized incivility as explicit disrespect or vulgarity, which may not capture subtler forms like sarcasm or passive aggression.
3. Medium of Communication: The research used text-based platforms like forums and tweets, which may not reflect how incivility operates in live debates or multimedia formats.  Step away from the keyboard and say it to my face!

Future research could explore:

• Broader definitions of incivility and their impact.
• Different communication channels (e.g., televised debates, social media videos).
• How incivility interacts with audience demographics beyond personality traits.
• How incivility interacts with source credibility.  

Conclusion

As my momma always said: “Jerks of a feather always flock together!”.  Okay, she has never said this, but she did warn me to take care of who I surround myself with.

Incivility isn’t universally persuasive, but it resonates with certain audiences, particularly individuals with populist attitudes or darker personality traits.

This suggests that while uncivil rhetoric can be a risky strategy, it may yield rewards in specific cultural and psychological contexts.

For political strategists, this research highlights the importance of tailoring communication styles to the audience.

For the rest of us, it raises an uncomfortable question: Are we more influenced by insults than we’d like to admit?

Clearly, the answer for some is “damn right, jerkface!”