Introduction

Ever thought about how much the average voter actually values democracy? Spoiler alert: it’s complicated.

Recently, someone sent me an article from the Atlantic entitled “Only About 3.5 Percent of Americans Care About Democracy (gift link)” and it referenced a study done by two professors from Yale.  

I was a bit surprised by the title and I went in search of the underlying study.  

I found it, and I am going to take some exception to the framing by the Atlantic, but let’s explore.  

While Americans wave the flag and champion “democracy” as the best form of government (even though we are a constitutional republic), researchers Matthew H. Graham and Milan W. Svolik put this concept to the test.

They set out to see if Americans would stand by democratic principles—even if it meant voting against their own political team.

So, let’s dive into what this study uncovers about the strength (or fragility) of democratic support in the U.S.

Methodology

Graham and Svolik used two complementary approaches to assess how willing American voters are to prioritize democracy over partisanship:

Survey Experiment with Hypothetical Candidates: The researchers designed a survey with a nationally representative sample of over 1,600 U.S. voters, asking participants to make choices between pairs of hypothetical candidates. To reflect real electoral scenarios, these candidates were randomly assigned specific party affiliations (Republican or Democrat), policy platforms (economic and social positions), and characteristics (like age, profession, and years of experience).

But here’s the twist: some candidates were also given undemocratic stances, such as supporting a reduction in polling places in areas favorable to the opposition, calling for prosecuting journalists, or endorsing gerrymandering. By mixing these attributes, the researchers could observe whether voters were more inclined to reject undemocratic candidates or, alternatively, overlook these behaviors to support their preferred party. Across 16 randomized choice scenarios, each participant revealed just how flexible they were with their commitment to democratic principles.

Natural Experiment in Montana’s 2017 Special Congressional Election: For a real-world angle, the researchers examined Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House, where one candidate notoriously assaulted a journalist shortly before election day. This incident served as a real-world “democracy violation”—a public act against democratic norms. Here’s the clever part: Montana has a large population of absentee voters, many of whom cast their ballots prior to the assault. By comparing absentee votes (pre-assault) with election day votes (post-assault), Graham and Svolik could isolate the impact of this undemocratic incident on voters’ choices. This natural experiment allowed them to test if, given clear evidence of anti-democratic behavior, partisans would still stand by their candidate.

This dual-method approach offered insight into the general principles voters claim to hold in surveys versus the principles they actually apply in real elections. In total, the study captured data from thousands of voter responses, offering a robust look at how flexible (or inflexible) Americans are when democracy itself is on the line.

Results and Findings

The findings might surprise you—or not, if you’re a realist about American politics. Here’s what Graham and Svolik found:

• Party Over Principle: A solid chunk of voters prioritized their party over democratic values, with about 86% of participants sticking with their partisan candidates, even when those candidates opposed democratic principles.
• Centrist Resistance: Political moderates were more likely than extremists to vote against undemocratic candidates, proving a rare pro-democratic force amid strong partisan loyalty.
• Double Standards Across Party Lines: Both Republicans and Democrats showed leniency towards undemocratic behaviors when it came from their own side but were more critical when it came from the opposing party.
• Natural Experiment Results: The Montana election’s results were consistent with the survey experiment: only voters in moderate areas punished the candidate for undemocratic actions, while partisans tended to stay loyal.

Critiques of the Research

While illuminating, this research has some limitations:

Timing: It’s worth noting that this research was conducted in 2018 and published in 2020, before the events surrounding January 6, 2021, and the ensuing media storm, and the 2024 campaign.

When studied, I’m not sure many Americans were seriously pondering threats to our democratic foundations.  This experiment was likely veiwed as more as a  hypothetical than a real, potential threat.

Here’s the question: if this study were repeated post-January 6—after such a seismic event—would we see stronger effects?  Larger partisan effects?  My guess is we would.

Respondents:  I cannot access the study’s appendix due to the paywall. However, based on common practices in academic research, I assume the participants are likely a convenience sample consisting of college-aged students. If this is the case, it’s reasonable to suppose that these students, as part of an academic exercise, would be inclined to downplay hypothetical threats to democracy. This is especially true when compared to more immediate concerns, such as the potential rejection of a date for that weekend.

Generalizability and Election Context: The findings from Montana’s special election might be unique to that context, especially considering the high-profile nature of the event and not generalizable to the entire country.

Conclusion

Writing about academic research is difficult (trust me!), balancing nuance with concise writing is a high wire act.  And the media has the additional need to attract readers meaning typically any nuance gets murdered in the headlines.

This brings us to a key nuance in Graham and Svolik’s study: it’s not that voters are indifferent to democracy, but rather that, in a polarized society, democratic values end up competing with the pull of partisanship and specific policy goals.  They take a back-seat especially if the threat is not salient.  

So, while democratic norms matter to Americans, only a small number are willing to sacrifice their other priorities to defend those norms—especially when it means opposing their own party.

This doesn’t mean that democratic principles don’t matter. However, when this study was conducted, I doubt many Americans felt democracy itself was truly at risk.  The threat was likely some far-off academic hypethtical scenario. 

Since the research and publication, focusing events have likely shifted perspectives, and I suspect future research will show that more than 3.5% of voters truly prioritize democracy.

Though this layered conclusion may sound troubling, it points to a possible path forward. Democratic values are still widely understood and can be made more salient and rise in importance – possibly to the center of our priorities.

Let’s continue our exploration of  polarization.

If you missed some of our previous posts here is a recent list:

• Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief
• Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger?Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition

It’s everywhere, right?

We’ve all been there: scrolling through social media and seeing that one post that makes your blood boil.

You know, the one from your uncle who insists peas bleong in guac (which, by the way, they do not). Or better yet, it’s political — and you’re ready to unfriend or block half of your family and some of your friends over their latest rants.

If you have ever witnessed me speak on politics, you have heard me discuss the overwhelming role emotions and affect play in our political process.  It about emotion, NOT your 10 point detailed policy plan.  PERIOD.

Now, we come across research that explores the question, and guess what – the growing divide between Democrats and Republicans isn’t actually about policy differences.  According to the academic research we’re about to dig into, it’s about affect, not ideology.

Risking confirmation bias and an entire cup of “I told you so”, let’s explore this research.

Introduction

We’ve been told political polarization is all about policy — left vs. right, conservative vs. liberal; and every graduate political science student has had to write a paper on “Just how divided is America, really?” picking a side between Abramowitz and Fiorina.

But Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes ask us to pause. They argue that what’s really driving the wedge isn’t our stances on healthcare or taxes; it’s our feelings about the other party.

The team explores whether polarization comes more from affect (emotion and how much we dislike the other party) rather than ideology (our policy positions).

Spoiler alert: it’s more about emotion than reason.

Methodology

The researchers used a variety of surveys to dig into how Americans feel about opposing political parties. They relied on data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), among others, to track political attitudes from 1960 to 2010.

With thousands of respondents, their sample size is large and robust.

These surveys measured people’s feelings toward their own party and the opposing one, often using “feeling thermometers”  to gauge how warmly or coldly participants felt about each party.

Results and Findings

Here’s where things get interesting (and a bit sad).

The findings show that over time, partisans’ feelings toward their own party have stayed pretty stable. People consistently rate their own party with a warm 70 out of 100.

But the real change? Their feelings toward the other party. The ratings for the opposing party have plummeted — falling by an average of 15 points since the 1980s. And in 2008, the average out-party rating dropped to just above 30.

Here’s the kicker: These negative feelings are based less on actual policy disagreements and more on a sort of tribal instinct.

The mere fact that someone identifies with the “other” side is enough to evoke a strong, negative reaction.

In fact, partisan animosity in the U.S. now exceeds divisions based on race or religion.

That’s right — we’re more divided by politics than by deeply ingrained social identities.

Critiques of the Research

While this study gives us a lot to chew on, it’s worth noting a few limitations.

First, the surveys mostly focus on attitudes in the U.S., so the findings may not be as generalizable to other countries with different political systems.

Additionally, the research was published in 2012 and uses historical data, it’s possible that modern changes in media consumption (like the rise of social media) might have further intensified these trends, something not fully captured in the study.  This is an area for replication and a refresh.

Another area worth exploring? The impact of local vs. national political climates. Does the intensity of local elections, for example, ramp up partisan hatred, or is it more about presidential campaigns and 24/7 news cycles?  Is all politics local or have all politics become nationalized?

Finally, could this be a function of partisans’ already sorting and being asymmetrically aligned on most major issues therefore looking for other reasons to be at each other throats?  While the authors suggest that affective polarization—disliking the opposing party—is not primarily a product of ideological differences on policies.  Instead, it appears to be driven more by social identity dynamics rather than by policy and affect polarization is distinct from policy polarization, a further exploration of causality would be interesting.

Regardless, polarization is likely driven by affect first.  My experience is it is emotion first, not policy.

Conclusion

So, what’s the takeaway here? Partisan polarization isn’t just about ideological divides or policy arguments — it’s personal. We don’t just disagree with the other side; we dislike them, and that dislike has deepened over time. As campaigns get nastier, and media outlets cater more to their partisan audiences, this trend is likely to continue. But, if you ask me, maybe we should all just take a deep breath, share a scotch, beer, and/or a class of wine, and try to listen more than we dislike.

So, you’re telling me that people get emotionally charged over politics? NO WAY!

Next, you’ll tell me that Tom doesn’t like Jerry, and the sun rises in the east.

But seriously, how does “affective polarization”—that gut-level emotional attachment where we love our party and loathe the other—affect what we believe? It turns out, it’s not just about cheering for your team; it might also mean believing whatever makes your side look good, even if it’s, well, a bit shaky on the facts.

Given the swirl of misinformation around FEMA’s hurricane response lately, I wanted to dig deeper into our previous exploration of affective polarization and explore how affective polarization shapes what people accept as truth.

Let’s explore some additional academic research that digs further into this phenomenon!

Introduction

The study by Libby Jenke focuses on how political party loyalty (affective polarization) influences our belief in misinformation, especially when the misinformation aligns with our own party.

Affective polarization has already been blamed for various social ills—like ruining Thanksgiving dinners—but what about its effects on political beliefs?

This paper argues that those who are highly polarized are more likely to believe misinformation that favors their party and dismiss information that favors the opposition.

Methodology

The study uses data from two sources: the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, both survey-based studies with large sample sizes (5104 and 6352 respondents, respectively). Jenke also conducted a survey experiment where participants played a game designed to increase or decrease their level of affective polarization. By comparing these responses, the study explores whether heightened polarization causes greater belief in misinformation.

Results and Findings

Here’s where it gets interesting. The research confirmed that affective polarization indeed makes people more likely to believe misinformation that supports their party’s narrative.

If you’re deeply emotionally invested in your political party, you’re more inclined to believe information—even false information—that makes your side look good. On the flip side, you’re more likely to reject anything that might put your opponents in a positive light, even if it’s true.

This pattern held for both Democrats and Republicans, with one caveat: political sophistication (meaning how much someone knows about politics) doesn’t help. In fact, more politically knowledgeable folks are just better at rationalizing their party’s misinformation.  

“Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it,” (Jenke 2023, p 825)

For example, Republicans were more likely to believe misinformation about illegal voting in the 2016 election and less likely to believe in Russian interference. Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that Trump deported more unauthorized immigrants than Obama—an inaccuracy.

The study found that increased affective polarization was a significant predictor of believing in-party-congruent misinformation and disbelieving out-party-congruent misinformation.

Critiques and Areas for Future Research

While the study does a solid job of linking affective polarization to misinformation belief, it doesn’t fully explore why political sophistication exacerbates the problem instead of mitigating it. Shouldn’t smarter people know better?

Another area for future study is how to break the cycle of polarization. The paper suggests that simply educating people more might not be enough—after all, the more politically savvy you are, the better you are at confirming your biases.

Moreover, the study’s focus on U.S. political dynamics raises questions about whether these findings would hold in other countries with different political structures or levels of polarization.

An interesting future study could explore these findings in a multi-party system to see if those citizens experience the same patterns.

Conclusion

In summary, the study adds to a growing body of research showing that our political loyalties don’t just affect how we vote—they can also cloud our judgment on what’s true and what’s false. And the scariest part? The more sophisticated we are, the better we become at finding reasons to cling to misinformation that favors our side. If you’re hoping that a Masters or PhD  degree will save democracy from misinformation… it might be time to adjust those expectations. There you have it: political polarization isn’t just dividing us socially, it’s influencing how we see reality itself. In this age of misinformation, understanding this dynamic is more important than ever. Stay skeptical, folks!

Title: Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition

Link: Affective Polarization Within Parties (2024)

Peer Review Status: Peer Reviewed

Citation (APSA format):
Young, David J. and Lee H. de-Wit. 2024. “Affective Polarization Within Parties.” Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973.

Introduction

Affective polarization—where we like our political tribe and dislike the opposing one—has been on the rise.

But unsurpingly: polarization doesn’t stop at the party line. Young and de-Wit (2024) dive into how this dislike festers within parties themselves.

In this paper, they focused on the U.S. and the U.K. to investigate if political factions within parties (think progressive vs. centrist Democrats or pro- and anti-Brexit Conservatives) can stir up as much, or more, animosity than traditional partisan battles.

Methodology

This paper contains the results of two studies:  One conducted using data from Great Britian, the second a stand alone study conducted within the US. 

Study 1 (Great Britain)

Young and de-Wit began by examining within-party polarization in the U.K. They embedded questions into two waves of an ongoing longitudinal study into polarization
in Great Britain (The MHP Polarization Tracker).

They surveyed British participants who identified with the Labour or Conservative parties. Participants were asked to rate how much they liked factions within their own party (e.g., Labour’s pro-Corbyn vs. pro-Starmer supporters) and factions from the opposing party. In addition, participants provided ratings on traits like kindness and intelligence, and their comfort with having a member of these factions as a friend.

The study involved two waves of data collection: one in February 2022 and another in July 2022. The final sample included over 900 participants in each wave, with analyses focusing on paired-sample t-tests to compare within-party factionalism against between-party polarization. 

Study 2 (United States)

In the U.S. study, the researchers employed a similar methodology but with a focus on American political factions. They surveyed 443 participants, using Prolific,  with Republicans and Democrats rating how they felt toward factions within their own party and in the opposing party. The U.S. factions included, for example, Trump-supporting Republicans versus Cheney-supporting Republicans and Biden-supporting Democrats versus AOC-supporting Democrats.

This study introduced a new dimension: participants were also asked how likely they would be to vote for their party’s presidential candidate if that candidate was from their opposing faction. 

Both studies highlighted how factional identities can sometimes eclipse party identities, leading to stronger negative feelings toward in-party rivals than toward members of opposing parties.

Results and Findings

The study found that within-party polarization is substantial, sometimes rivaling or even exceeding between-party polarization.

In both the U.K. and U.S., participants frequently showed a strong preference for their own faction within the party over rival factions.  

“While within-party affective polarization tends to be weaker than between-party,
it can be just as strong or even stronger in some cases—six of the 14 factions showed a preference for themselves over their in-party rival faction that had an effect at least
as large as a between-party effect in their country” (p. 16)

In Study 1 (Great Britain), participants exhibited significant within-party polarization, particularly among Labour factions. The findings showed that Labour’s factions had higher affective polarization than Conservative factions. For instance, participants who preferred Corbyn rated their faction much more positively than rival factions supporting Starmer, with effect sizes in the moderate-to-large range (p. 9)​ This division was significant enough that many participants preferred an out-party faction, like Brexit-supporting Conservatives, over their in-party rivals (p. 9).

Study 2 (United States) showed similar results. Trump-supporting Republicans had higher levels of affective polarization toward rival factions within their own party, such as those supporting Liz Cheney, compared to Democrats (p. 13). Interestingly, within-party polarization was strongest among Republicans, particularly on controversial issues like Trump’s leadership and the 2020 election results (p. 14)​.

In both studies, there were instances where participants expressed a preference for an out-party faction over their in-party rivals. This was particularly noticeable among Labour supporters in the U.K. and pro-Trump Republicans in the U.S., where the animosity toward in-party rivals exceeded that toward members of the opposing party (p. 9 and p. 15)​.

These findings challenge the notion that political divisions are primarily between parties and suggest that factional disputes within parties can drive as much or more polarization than traditional partisan divides.

Critiques and Areas for Future Study

While this study provides fascinating insights, there are a few limitations. For one, the factions studied were selected based on current high-profile disagreements, which might not capture long-term trends in party divisions. Additionally, while the study focused on significant factional disputes, it’s possible that future research could benefit from examining smaller, less obvious factions to get a fuller picture of within-party polarization.  Asking what does a faction let slide versus go to war over? Another point for future exploration? Investigating how factional identity impacts not just feelings of animosity but actual voting behavior. While the authors performed some additional analysis finding:  “No faction was more likely to vote for an out-party candidate than the candidate from the rival factional , though the Cheney faction was no more likely to vote for Trump than either Biden, “(p. 17) this area remains ripe for additional study. What are the factors that lead to cross over voting and party switches?  Are they push or pull factors? Could factional splits within a party eventually lead to new parties or movements altogether?  Realignments? This research just scratches the surface of that possibility, but is does add some knowledge to a topic derth of research.

It’s that time of year again—oppo dumps, October surprises, and all the drama that comes with them! For years, we’ve been preaching to our clients: “Hang a light on your vulnerabilities before someone else does.” Every time, we hear the same protests: “What if they don’t find it?”—They will. “What if they don’t use it?”—They will. “What if it doesn’t resonate with the public?”—It might.

The smartest move? Own your issues, get ahead of them, and do it early.

This strategy is called inoculation. And guess what? There’s research to back it up!

 

Title: The Relative Effectiveness of Inoculation, Bolstering, and Combined Approaches in Crisis Communication

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1532-754X.2004.11925131

Peer Review Status: Peer Reviewed – Yes

Citation: Wan, H. H., & Fau, P. F. “The Relative Effectiveness of Inoculation, Bolstering, and Combined Approaches in Crisis Communication.” Journal of Applied Communication Research.

Introduction

Crisis communication is a crucial element for organizations or campaigns navigating public relations challenges. In their study, Wan and Fau explore how three distinct approaches—Inoculation, Bolstering, and a Combined Approach—impact crisis communication. By focusing on the effectiveness of each strategy in mitigating negative perceptions, their work highlights the practical tools organizations can employ to better manage public opinion during a crisis.

Some definitions:  

• • • Inoculation – In the context of crisis communication, inoculation is a strategy that involves preemptively addressing potential criticisms or negative information before they arise. 
    • Bolstering – Bolstering is a crisis communication tactic where an organization highlights its positive attributes or past successes to offset negative information.
    • Combined Approach – The Combined Approach in crisis communication merges the strategies of inoculation and bolstering.

Methodology

The study involved a controlled experiment with participants exposed to different crisis communication strategies: Inoculation (pre-emptively addressing potential criticisms), Bolstering (highlighting positive aspects of the organization), and a Combined Approach (integrating both strategies).

The authors measured participant reactions across various scenarios and time points, assessing both immediate and delayed responses to these communication efforts. This design allowed them to determine which strategy had the most lasting impact on audience attitudes and crisis perceptions.

Results and Findings

Wan and Fau’s findings indicate that the Combined Approach—blending both Inoculation and Bolstering—was the most effective at mitigating damage to an organization’s reputation during a crisis.

While Inoculation alone proved useful in preempting negative reactions, it was less effective in generating long-term positive feelings.

Bolstering, on the other hand, helped enhance favorable perceptions but fell short when participants encountered counterarguments.

The Combined Approach, however, provided a balance, reinforcing the organization’s strengths while simultaneously addressing vulnerabilities, resulting in a more resilient public perception.

Critiques of the Research and Additional Areas of Potential Study

While the study presents strong evidence in favor of the Combined Approach, it primarily focuses on short-term crisis management. A critique lies in the lack of long-term analysis beyond the experimental setting.

Future studies could expand this research by examining how these strategies play out in real-world scenarios over extended periods, such as during long-term corporate scandals or political crises.

Moreover, understanding the psychological underpinnings of why the Combined Approach works so effectively could offer deeper insights into communication strategy development.

Conclusion

Wan and Fau’s research provides valuable guidance for organizations seeking to navigate crises more effectively.

Their work underscores the importance of adopting a multifaceted approach that combines proactive and positive messaging.

 Or, simply Hang a Lantern on your problems before someone else does.