Understanding Political Polarization: Causes, Impacts, and Why It Matters

Introduction to Polarization

I’ve written about polarization many times over the past year. It’s one of the most significant factors in U.S. politics today, if not the most. Typically, I focus on one individual study or paper, but today I want to zoom out and examine the findings in a broader context.

Neo-Beginnings

Every graduate student in political science since the early 2010s has likely written a paper reconciling the academic “disagreement” between Morris Fiorina and Alan Abramowitz.

As far as academic “disagreements” go this one was…combative and sharp.   It was / is a doozy.

The argument in a nutshell:

• • Fiorina argues that polarization is primarily an elite-driven phenomenon, with political elites (politicians, activists, media) becoming more polarized while the mass public remains relatively moderate. For the general public, he suggests that there is more sorting than true ideological polarization—voters align their party identification with their preferences, but they are not deeply divided on most policy issues. (Fiorina et al, 2011)
• • Abramowitz, on the other hand, emphasizes that polarization is widespread among the electorate, especially among the most engaged citizens, who have become more ideologically consistent and politically divided. He argues that as the electorate becomes more polarized, affective polarization (i.e., the emotional dislike of opposing partisans) increases. (Abramowitz, 2017)

For me, it was strange argument because their views are compatible with each other, when you ask the question, “Under what circumstances can both of these positions be correct?”  (Especially when we have the ability to consider additional research?)

Among political elites, Abramowitz is right—polarization is high, emotional, and often extreme. Among non-elites, Fiorina’s position holds more weight, but research suggests he may be looking in the wrong place.

Most of the general public doesn’t deeply care about politics. This is estimated by some to be 20-30% of the people (Kalmoe, 2020).  I have seen some that estimate it as low as 15% (Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD., n.d.).

However, when polled about policy, many give moderate responses—what they often mean is, “I don’t know, and I don’t care.” This middle-of-the-road answer satisfies the pollster but doesn’t represent how they’ll vote.

Instead, their behavior is guided by cues from political leaders or social circles. These cues encourage distrust and dislike of the opposing party, making voter behavior appear polarized even when personal ideology isn’t.

Said another way, it is really difficult for any pollster to capture an answer posed about the funding mechanisms of charter schools when the answer is likely closer to:

“meh, I don’t really care about this issue and/or I am not knowledgeable about the issue.  I’ll answer your question with a middle of the road answer because you asked politely – but know I will very likely govern my political behavior by cues received from my political party – especially political leaders – and/or my social circle that I value which are now highly correlated.  And both of those are likely to tell me not to like the “other” party and that is basic human nature anyway, so my political behavior and voting will appear polarized too.” – voter

To add some final nuance: Abramowitz’s view dominates in low-turnout elections, like primaries, where highly engaged voters participate in mostly non-competitive districts. (and well since political elites and political nerds tend to hang out together… their perception is of extreme polarization…leading to more affect polarization…leading the public…)

But I digress, Fiorina’s perspective becomes more relevant in general elections, where turnout is higher and broader.

Drivers of Polarization

Let’s shift gears to what drives polarization. Looking at U.S. trends since the 1960s, the literature points to several familiar themes:

• • Economic inequality: The growing gap between rich and poor (McCarty et al., 2007; Zacher, 2024).
  • Racial issues: A key driver in the U.S. (McAdam, 2015).
  • Partisan realignment: Spurred by economic inequality and civil rights movements (Highton, 2020; Kuziemko & Washington, 2018).
  • Media fragmentation: The rise of ideologically selective media (Prior, 2005; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).
  • Geographic sorting: Americans increasingly live near like-minded neighbors (Cho et al., 2013).
  • Uncompetitive districts: Less competition leads to more extreme partisanship (Stonecash et al., 2018).

Human Nature and Affect

While these structural factors matter, in my take of the subject if I zoom out: basic human nature and human psychology are the real driving forces.

Most polarization today isn’t driven by ideology but by emotion and affect—a gut-level dislike of “others” (Young & de-Wit, 2024). Party and geographic sorting (Cho et al., 2013) make it easier to identify “them” as “others”, and human nature does the rest. We’re hardwired to distrust outsiders.

This is where Fiorina was looking in the wrong place for polarization.  For many, politics is not not a well thought set of political ideology or issue stances (Kalmoe, 2020).

Rather for many, politics is driven by a gut reaction and the details are outsourced to elites (Lenz, 2013), who are happy to exploit these emotional divides for power and re-election (Karol, 2015).

Impacts on Governing

The consequences of affective polarization are severe:

1. Growing contempt: Americans increasingly distrust “others” (Geiger, 2014).
2. Exaggerated perceptions: We overestimate how extreme our opponents’ positions really are (Lees & Cikara, 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2021).
3. Declining cooperation: Dislike makes compromise nearly impossible (Geiger, 2014b).
4. Government dysfunction: Legislative gridlock is the norm (Binder, 2004).
5. Eroding trust: Polarization harms trust in government (American Academy, 2023), media (Shearer, 2024), and even each other (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2017; Lee, 2022).
6. Risk of violence: At its extreme , polarization creates “an environment in which political violence is more socially acceptable and frequent”  (Piazza, 2023).

What’s Next?

Can anything be done about polarization?  Can we stop this polarization?  Is the current polariation any worse than the polarization seen pre-1960?  All questions for another blog post.

I’ve briefly touched on this topic before in What is the Solution to Extreme Divisiveness? You can check it out here. Spoiler: one solution might involve sharing scotch with someone you disagree with.

But what’s next topic deserves another deep dive. Stay tuned.

Previous Blog Posts on Polarization

• • Does Policy really matter in political campaigns?
  • Vibe Check: Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology
  • Do Americans Really Care About ‘Democracy’?
  • Hyper-partisanship & Hyper-polarization : America’s Pending Divorce 
  • Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief 
  • Intra-party fighting – family spats or real anger? Affective Polarization Within Parties: When Partisan Rivals Dislike Each Other More Than the Opposition
  • What is the solution to extreme divisiveness? 

References

Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American democracy. Yale University Press.

Binder, S. A. (2004). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Brookings Institution.

Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2013). Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(4), 856–870.

Highton, B. (2020). The cultural realignment of state white electorates in the 21st century. Political Behavior, 42(4), 1319–1341. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09590-5

Distrust, political polarization, and America’s challenged institutions. (2023, May 17). American Academy of Arts & Sciences; Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/news/distrust-political-polarization-and-americas-challenged-institutions

Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2011). Culture war? The myth of a polarized America (3rd ed.). Pearson.

Geiger, A. (2014, June 12). Political polarization in the American public. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public

Geiger, A. (2014b, June 12). Section 4: Political compromise and divisive policy debates. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisive-policy-debates/

Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2017). Political trust and polarization. In E. M. Uslaner (Ed.), Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.15

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. The Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x

Kalmoe, N. P. (2020). Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 41(4), 771–794.

Karol, D. (2015). Party activists, interest groups, and polarization in American politics. In American Gridlock (pp. 68–85). Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, I., & Washington, E. (2018). Why did the Democrats lose the South? Bringing new data to an old debate. American Economic Review, 108(10), 2830–2867. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161413

Lee, A. H.-Y. (2022). Social trust in polarized times: How perceptions of political polarization affect Americans’ trust in each other. Political Behavior, 44(3), 1533–1554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09787-1

Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2020). Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(3), 279–286. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

Lenz, G. S. (2013). Follow the leader?: How voters respond to politicians’ policies and performance. University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. (2015). Be careful what you wish for: The ironic connection between the Civil Rights struggle and today’s divided America. Sociological Forum (Randolph, N.J.), 30(S1), 485–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12173

Piazza, J. A. (2023). Political polarization and political violence. Security Studies, 32(3), 476–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780

Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches. (2007). In Choice Reviews Online (Vol. 44, Issue 06, pp. 44-3551-44–3551). American Library Association. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-3551

Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x

Ruggeri, K., Većkalov, B., Bojanić, L., Andersen, T. L., Ashcroft-Jones, S., Ayacaxli, N., Barea-Arroyo, P., Berge, M. L., Bjørndal, L. D., Bursalıoğlu, A., Bühler, V., Čadek, M., Çetinçelik, M., Clay, G., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Damnjanović, K., Dugue, T. M., Esberg, M., Esteban-Serna, C., … Folke, T. (2021). The general fault in our fault lines. Nature Human Behaviour, 5(10), 1369–1380. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01092-x

Shearer, E. (2024, October 10). Americans’ views of 2024 election news. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/

Speaking of Psychology: The psychology behind our political divide, with Keith Payne, PhD. (n.d.). Apa.org. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.apa.org/news/podcasts/speaking-of-psychology/political-divide

Stonecash, J. M., Brewer, M. D., & Mariani, M. D. (2018). Diverging parties: Social change, realignment, and party polarization. Routledge.

Young, D. J., & de-Wit, L. H. (2024). Affective polarization within parties. Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973

Zacher, S. (2024). Polarization of the rich: The new Democratic allegiance of affluent Americans and the politics of redistribution. Perspectives on Politics, 22(2), 338–356. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722003310